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I. INTRODUCTION
A nonparty witness who responds to questioning by invoking the
privilege against self-incrimination seriously can impair the party
against whom the response suggests an unfavorable answer.2 The possi-
ble injury to a party's case is greatest when the invocation occurs unex-
pectedly at trial, but may cause equal damage when the privilege is
relied on during discovery because the deposition of an unavailable wit-
ness may be read to the jury.3 In the past, courts and commentators
generally opposed allowing such invocations in the jury's presence
based on the belief that invocations lack credible evidentiary value be-
cause witnesses can invoke validly for a variety of reasons;4 and despite
some arguable relevance, the highly prejudicial nature of an invocation
intolerably taints the fairness of the trial process.' Consequently, those
who opposed drawing conclusions about witnesses who rely upon the
fifth amendment argued that the fact of invocation must be kept from
juries, counsel must be prohibited from commenting on invocations that
occur in court, and judges must be prevented from acknowledging that
inferences may arise from the assertions of privilege. The belief was
that the trial process must ignore a fifth amendment invocation regard-
less of how unfair the result might be.
Prevailing attitudes began to change in 1975 after Congress re-
jected Article V of the Federal Rules of Evidence.' Ten years earlier the
2. One author stated:
[I]f viewed as "evidence," [flifth [a]mendment claims, whose impact cannot be ameliorated
through cross-examination, will be far more damaging to a defendant than substantive testi-
mony .... From a plaintiff's standpoint, therefore, a limited amount of live testimony osten-
sibly corroborated by [f]ifth [a]mendment claims, with their highly prejudicial impact, is
often more effective than, and preferable to, the presentation of conventional evidence.
Hartwell, The Fifth Amendment in Civil Antitrust Litigation: Procedure and Strategy-The De-
fendant's View, 50 ANTrrRuST L.J. 847, 848 (1982).
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 32.
4. See infra notes 173-88, and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
6. In 1973 the House Committee on the Judiciary eliminated all specific rules on privileges as
submitted by the United States Supreme Court. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1973),
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 7075, 7082. When Congress passed the Federal
Rules of Evidence in 1974 (effective July 1, 1975), it adopted the House position and deleted all of
Article V, which dealt with privileges. In its stead, Congress substituted Rule 501, which states in
part:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act of
Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the
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United States Supreme Court had ruled that comment by the prosecu-
tor on a criminal defendant's refusal to take the witness stand violated
the defendant's rights under the fifth amendment.' By 1976, three years
after Congress first rejected the "No Comment" rule of Proposed Fed-
eral Rule 513,8 the Court held that the Constitution did not forbid an
adverse inference by the trier of fact when a party to a civil case re-
fused to testify for fear of self-incrimination.9
Lower federal courts and commentators, expanding on the Su-
preme Court's analysis of fifth amendment privilege in the civil context,
recently have argued that adversarial fairness often requires permitting
the jury to draw a negative inference against a party based upon a non-
party's invocation of the privilege. 10 The reported cases largely involve
inferences against corporate parties, but use of such inferences could be
extended logically and fairly to other contexts."
Plaintiffs, hoping to gain the enhanced remedies available under
such acts as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) and the treble damage provisions of the antitrust laws, increas-
ingly are charging their civil adversaries with the commission of a
crime. Defendants (and those in some agency, employment, or conspira-
torial relationship with them) are responding more frequently to these
taunts by broadly asserting the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. 2 An emerging trend, in turn, suggests that more courts
are permitting the factfinder to draw adverse inferences based on these
invocations. Despite this liberalization in allowing juries to attach sub-
stantive evidentiary weight to nonparty invocations in appropriate cir-
cumstances, the possibility of unfair prejudice remains if adverse
privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be gov-
erned by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience....
FED. R. EVID. 501.
7. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
8. See Proposed Rule 513 infra note 194.
9. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
10. A typical adverse inference instruction was given in RAI) Services v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 808 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1986), discussed infra notes 226-34 and accompanying text.
The instruction reads:
During the trial you also heard evidence by past or present employees of the plaintiff refusing
to answer certain questions on the grounds that it may tend to incriminate them. A witness
has a constitutional right to decline to answer on the grounds that it may tend to incriminate
him. You may, but you need not, infer by such refusal that the answers would have been
adverse to the plaintiff's interests.
RAD Services, 808 F.2d at 277.
11. See infra notes 218-25, 235-40 and accompanying text.




inferences are abused or allowed without sound justification.13 The use
of adverse inferences, therefore, should be limited to situations of ne-
cessity after preliminary tests of fairness indicate their need.
This Note addresses the uncertainty of using adverse inferences
against parties based on nonparty invocations and proposes a method-
ology to determine when the inference is fair and justified and how it
should be presented to juries. Part II discusses the two principal poli-
cies that are at stake when adverse inferences derive from nonparty in-
vocations of the fifth amendment, beginning with an analysis of how
the history and policies behind liberal discovery relate to proof ob-
tained from nonparties. 14 The second section of Part II analyzes the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and reviews the
policies, scope, abuses, and efforts to control abuses of the privilege. 5
Part III presents the cases in which these issues have clashed in the
context of nonparty witness invocations.1" Part IV sets forth a method-
ology to gauge whether adverse inferences based on assertions of privi-
lege by nonparties should be permitted in particular cases. The
methodology borrows standards from the federal evidence rules and ap-
plies broadly to most conceivable situations. If adopted, it would limit
the use of adverse inferences to situations of fairness and necessity. 17
This part concludes with a Model Jury Instruction on adverse infer-
ences.' s8 Finally, Part V concludes that adverse inferences can assist a
party having an apparently meritorious claim after certain witnesses
impede that party from reaching the jury by invoking the fifth amend-
ment privilege. Adverse inferences, however, are "strong medicine," so
courts must determine with a high degree of certainty that allowing in-
ferences based upon invocations of the fifth amendment are appropriate
and necessary on the facts before them.
II. POLICIES AT ISSUE
A. Liberal Discovery
Modern rules of civil procedure afford such broad investigatory
tools in preparing for trial that it is inconceivable that a party would
13. Professor Victor Gold stated that "[m]ost courts are content to conclude evidence has
probative value or is unfairly prejudicial without considering the meaning of those terms. Not
surprisingly, many cases do not even attempt to weigh probative value against unfair prejudice or,
while purporting to weigh, give no explanation for the result." Gold, Limiting Judicial Discretion
to Exclude Prejudicial Evidence, 18 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 59, 61-62 (1984) (footnote omitted).
14. See infra notes 22-54 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 55-195 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 196-252 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 253-75 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 276-81 and accompanying text.
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proceed to litigation before having engaged in wide-ranging pretrial dis-
covery. 19 Relevant proof in many forms often is obtained from persons
and entities not party to the lawsuit.20 Nonparty invocations of the
privilege leading ultimately to adverse inferences against parties to the
lawsuit frequently have occurred during discovery depositions. 1 Thus, a
brief discussion of the policies and scope of liberal discovery is in order.
1. Policies
The days of testimonial disqualification of interested parties2 2 have
passed and policies favoring liberal proof derived from liberal discovery
now are reflected in both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" and the
Federal Rules of Evidence.24 The opinion of lawyers toward litigation
prior to the advent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has been
described aptly as the "sporting theory of justice. ' 25 Not infrequently,
victory went to the party with counsel more skillful at playing the game
of surprise than to the party rightfully deserving to win on the merits.26
19. See Cutner, Discovery-Civil Litigation's Fading Light: A Lawyer Looks at the Federal
Discovery Rules After Forty Years of Use, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 933, 944 n.39 (1979).
20. Getman, Federal "Third-Party" Discovery in the Small Antitrust Case, 45 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 311 (1979) (discussing various factors which support the undertaking of nonparty discovery).
The author notes:
A final advantage of nonparty discovery is that the nonparty may be the sole possessor of
crucial information. For example, the nonparty may have valuable documents no one else has
or that no one else has kept, or may have copies of documents that others have but to which
the nonparty has added notations.
Id. at 312.
21. See infra notes 218-25 and accompanying text. In 1970 the rules were amended exten-
sively and renumbered. The rules governing oral depositions were transferred from Rule 26(a) to
Rule 30, and in the process, "the provision of the former rule that depositions may be taken 'for
the purpose of discovery or for use as evidence in the action or for both purposes' was omitted,"
the idea being well understood that a deposition might, in addition, be taken for use at trial. 8 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2101, at 367 (1970).
22. See C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EvIDENcE § 65, at 159 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984); Clark,
The Proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 22 A.BA. J. 447, 450 (1936).
23. Defining the scope of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1 states that "[tihey
shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." FED.
R. Civ. P. 1. Rule 30 begins: "After commencement of the action, any party may take the testimony
of any person, including a party, by deposition upon oral examiiation." FED. R. Civ. P. 30.
24. Rule 102 states: "These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration,
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the
law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined."
FED. R. EVID. 102.
This philosophy is continued in Rule 601, which states in part that "[e]very person is compe-
tent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules." FED. R. EvIn. 601.
25. This phrase has been attributed both to Professor Wigmore, in Holtzoff, The Elimina-
tion of Surprise in Federal Practice, 7 VAD. L. R.v. 576, 578 (1954) and to Roscoe Pound, in
Holland, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: A Policy Evaluation, 3 LAw. & POL'Y Q. 209, 211
(1981).
26. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 81, at 541 (1983); see also Holtzoff, supra
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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure attempted to halt this practice by
throwing discovery wide open. A "fishing expedition" now is allowed if
fish are likely to be caught.28 Broad discovery better serves justice by
increasing the probability that factfinders will decide cases on their
merits and not on innuendo. 9
In Hickman v. Taylor,0 decided by the Supreme Court ten years
after the Federal Rules became effective, Justice Murphy noted that
because of the liberalized rules, federal civil trials "no longer need be
carried on in the dark."3' Eleven years later, the Court stated that fed-
eral pretrial discovery and procedures, by disclosing facts and issues as
fully as practicable, produce fairer trials and fewer instances of "blind
man's bluff. '3 2 Commentators have articulated three purposes of liberal
discovery: (1) to narrow issues so that only genuinely disputed issues
remain for trial resolution; (2) to gather and preserve evidence for the
hearing; and (3) to procure leads by which additional relevant docu-
mentary evidence or knowledgeable witnesses may be ascertained. 3
Professor Charles Wright stated that the "basic philosophy" behind the
Rules is that all parties should have access to all relevant non-privi-
leged information before trial, regardless of by whom it is possessed."'
Thus, the clear intent of the Rules, as affirmed by the Supreme Court,
is to maximize the evidence available to all parties, thereby insuring
more just and efficient results.
note 25, at 579 (stating that trials "should not be viewed as a melodrama or a mystery play, in
which the success of the performance depends upon keeping the denouement secret from the be-
holders and leaving them in a state of suspense until the end").
27. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MMLER, supra note 21, § 2001, at 15-17.
28. Holtzoff, supra note 25, at 577-78.
29. F. JAMES, Crin PROCEDURE 184 (1965). Professor James identified several aspects favoring
this extensive discovery:
-Discovery tends to narrow the issues to be tried by revealing lack of serious contest on some
and by pointing up those likely to be crucial.
-Discovery tends to facilitate the presentation of evidence at the trial by increasing the like-
lihood that all relevant evidence will be known and analyzed before trial.
-This in turn increases the likelihood that cases will be decided on their actual merits.
-Pretrial discovery gets statements which are fresher in time and less likely to be excessively
rehearsed.
-Discovery weeds out groundless claims and defenses, at least where the party who asserts
them in his pleadings is not willing or able to engage in effective perjury to back them up.
-Discovery increases the chances of pretrial settlements. As the parties' knowledge about
each other's points of strength and weakness increases, uncertainty about the reasonable set-
tlement value of the claim is reduced.
Id. (footnote omitted).
30. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
31. Id. at 501.
32. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958).
33. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 21, § 2001, at 15; see also Developments in the
Law-Discovery, 74 HARv. L. REV. 940, 944-46 (1961) [hereinafter Discovery].
34. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 21, § 2001, at 15.
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Though liberal discovery sometimes places burdens on parties and
nonparties that are disproportionate to the interests at stake, liberal
discovery under the Federal Rules has furthered the goal of procuring
more just results and has improved greatly the functioning and admin-
istration of the civil justice system.3 5 Judge Holtzoff, a member of the
Rules drafting committee, believed that federal court litigation had
been "completely revolutionized" through liberal discovery.36 Another
commentator, writing in 1939, said that discovery had been "vitalized"
by the Rules and had attained a role of great importance in federal
litigation. 7
In addition to furthering justice between the immediate parties to
litigation, liberal discovery furthers public confidence in law and soci-
ety." The public interest lies in achieving fair results in accordance
with stated law through courts that are freely accessible to all citizens.39
These goals are reached when parties and witnesses fulfill their duty to
provide the evidence needed to adjudicate controversies justly.40 The
public is benefited by knowing that persons who fail to abide by the law
will face liability while those who do abide will not.41 This public inter-
est benefit of liberal discovery is possible largely because evidence is
obtainable so freely in the early stages of the adjudicative process.
2. Scope
The discovery rules provide a broader interpretation of relevance
than is permitted for evidentiary purposes.42 The limits on discovery
are aimed primarily at the use of the information obtained rather than
its acquisition. 3 Liability insurance coverage, for example, is discovera-
ble, but not admissible at trial. Rule 26, which governs the scope of all
discovery under the Federal Rules, provides that "[p]arties may obtain
discovery of any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action.""
Particularly burdensome and intrusive discovery devices may be
35. Discovery, supra note 33, at 942.
36. See Holtzoff, A Judge Looks at the Rules After Fifteen Years of Use, 15 F.R.D. 155, 164
(1954).
37. Dobie, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 VA. L. REv. 261, 279 (1939).
38. See Cutner, supra note 19, at 934.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 937.
41. Id. at 934.
42. See FED. R Cirv. P. 26(b)(1) (stating that "[i]t is not ground for objection [to discovery]
that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence").
43. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 21, § 2001, at 15; C. WRIGHT, supra note 26, § 81, at
543.
44. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(1).
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used only against parties, but the discovery device of preference-the
oral deposition-is available against anyone.45 Parties wishing to depose
nonparty witnesses must secure their attendance by subpoena, which
may direct the witnesses to bring specific documents.46 The subpoena
may be directed to a corporation, which then nominates a natural per-
son to testify in its behalf.47 The nonparty deponent may request the
court to modify, limit, or quash the subpoena if it is unduly burden-
some or beyond relevancy, or move for a protective order providing con-
fidentiality to his testimony.4 Deposition testimony may be used at
trial, as authorized under Rule 32(a)(3), or for any purpose allowed by
the Federal Rules of Evidence.
From the standpoint of a party seeking discovery, the principal
limitation of discovery from nonparties is the invocation of privilege. 49
Protective orders exist in part to limit patent abuses of discovery from
nonparties. Relevance is construed so broadly, however, that even as to
nonparties, courts are likely to err in favor of permitting discovery de-
spite apparently tenuous links to relevancy.50 Generally, nonparty wit-
nesses cannot avoid discovery by asserting that they do not have
relevant information because the discovering party is entitled to test
the propriety of their claim.5
On the other hand, a properly invoked privilege may insulate oth-
erwise discoverable information. Although the limits of discovery are
measured by a broader scope of relevance than would be permitted by
the Federal Rules of Evidence, the scope of privilege during discovery is
precisely the same as would apply at trial.5" This identical scope of
privilege may cause a nonparty's deposition invocation to have detri-
mental impact at trial because when the invocation is read to the jury it
may suggest the witness's guilt regarding the matter inquired, and the
45. Holtzoff, supra note 36. Judge Holtzoff called oral depositions "the most potent and the
most useful of all discovery remedies." Id. at 166. Prior to passage of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, deposition practice in the federal courts existed solely to preserve evidence. Any resul-
tant discovery was a matter of luck. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 21, § 2002, at 21.
46. Sunbeam Corp. v. Payless Drug, 113 F. Supp. 31, 46 (N.D. Cal. 1953).
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6).
48. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
49. Professor Wright identifies three principal limitations on broad discovery: (1) Discovery
must be relevant to the subject matter; (2) discovery may not extend to matters privileged; and (3)
discovery, in general, may not extend to the attorney's work product. C. WRIGHT, supra note 26, §
81, at 548-50. The second limitation will have greatest impact on nonparty discovery because costs
will limit genuinely irrelevant discovery from nonparties, and the work product doctrine does not
apply.
50. See generally 4 J. MooRe, J. LucAs & G. GROTHEER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1
26.56[1], at 26-101 to -107 (1987) [hereinafter J. MooRE].
51. Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 964
(1965); C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 21, § 2037, at 275 n.52.
52. J. MooRE, supra note 50, 26.60[1], at 26-188.
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party thereby affected rarely will be allowed to probe the invocation. 3
As with invocations at trial, however, deposition invocations of privilege
are construed narrowly,54 and the burden of proving their existence is
on the witness claiming the privilege. The scope and limitations of the
privilege against self-incrimination are discussed in the following sec-
tion and apply to invocations of privilege by parties and nonparties
alike.
B. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
The privilege against self-incrimination is based upon an ideal of
preventing the state from substituting judicially compelled confessions
for legitimately obtained proof.55 The privilege applies equally in civil
and criminal actions, protecting both nonparty witnesses and parties to
the same extent.56 Witnesses are entitled constitutionally to assert the
privilege broadly-the potential answer needs only to provide the pros-
ecutor with a "link in the chain of evidence" for the invocation to be
upheld.57 In the past few years, however, the Court has retreated to a
less liberal interpretation of fifth amendment privilege.58 This retrac-
tion may illustrate Dean Wigmore's observation that there is no general
agreement regarding the policies supporting the privilege against self-
incrimination.59
Some time ago, Judge Friendly delivered a lecture in which he pro-
53. See infra notes 101-04 and accompanying text. Such invocations usually are edited out
when deposition transcripts of unavailable witnesses are read to the jury. Appropriate limits, as
suggested in this Note, should reduce the likelihood that courts will expand unreasonably the prac-
tice of bringing nonparty invocations to the jury's attention.
54. J. MOORE, supra note 50, 26.60[1], at 26-188 & n.4 (listing relevant cases).
55. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2263, at 378 (McNaughton rev. ed.
1961). In 1964 Justice Goldberg wrote:
[The privilege] reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our un-
willingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, per-
jury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of
criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane
treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates "a fair state-individual balance by
requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for dis-
turbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder
the entire load," . . . ; our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the
right of each individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a private life," . . . ; our
distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege, while some-
times "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to the innocent."
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 370 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (citations omitted).
56. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924).
57. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
58. O'Brien, The Fifth Amendment: Fox Hunters, Old Women, Hermits, and the Burger
Court, 54 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 26 & n.5 (1978). See generally Note, Miranda and the State Con-
stitution: State Courts Take a Stand, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1693 (1986).
59. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 55, § 2251, at 296.
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posed to modify and significantly contract the privilege to its historical
intent as envisioned by the framers of the Bill of Rights.60 Conceding
that numerous policy justifications could be proffered in support of the
"multifaceted" privilege, Judge Friendly dismissed most of the reasons
set forth in Justice Goldberg's "market basket" analysis. 1 Judge
Friendly concluded by suggesting an amendment that, under limited
safeguards, would permit comment on refusals by defendants to answer
questions relevant to criminal investigations.2
A contraction of the fifth amendment privilege, though not to the
extent proposed by Judge Friendly, has occurred, as illustrated in the
discussion below. 3 The reduced availability of the privilege has had
particular impact in civil cases; thus, parties must recognize that invok-
ing the privilege is not without consequence. Similarly, under appropri-
ate circumstances a court may permit the jury to burden a party in a
civil case with the effect of a nonparty's claim of privilege.
1. Policies
A broad range of policies has been offered in support of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination."' Many of the policies have been derived
from the history of the privilege; 5 however, as Dean Wigmore noted,
60. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case For Constitutional Change, 37 U.
CIN. L. REv. 671 (1968). Friendly stated:
The time has come, I believe, when the nation should face up to the hard task of considering
an amendment to the self-incrimination clause that will preserve all the framers said and
some of the Supreme Court's extensions, modify others, expunge some altogether, and guard
against accretions which seem in the making.
Id. at 672. Judge Friendly's amendment proposed to limit the privilege strictly to incriminating
oral statements by the accused in criminal trials and would have allowed the judge to comment
upon the defendant's previous refusals to answer questions relevant to the crime before judicial
officers, grand juries, and other investigatory bodies. Id. at 721-22.
61. See id. at 695, 698.
62. See id. at 721-22.
63. See infra note 194 and accompanying text (demonstrating that invocations of the privi-
lege-particularly by parties-are not without consequences); see also O'Brien, supra note 58, at
26 n.5.
64. A more comprehensive evaluation of the policies behind the privilege is beyond the scope
of this Note. This Note, therefore, presents only a brief survey of those policies which generally are
considered to provide the soundest justifications for the privilege in modern context. For more
thorough treatments of the policies behind the privilege, see generally: L. LEvY, ORIGINS OF THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT (1968); C. McCoRMICK, supra note 22, §§ 114-18, at 279-88; 8 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 55, § 2251, at 295; and O'Brien, supra note 58, at 33-54.
65. See L. LEvY, supra note 64, at 332. Professor Levy wrote:
It was, in its origins, unquestionably the invention of those who were guilty of religious
crimes, like heresy, schism, and nonconformity, and, later, of political crimes like treason,
seditious libel, and breach of parliamentary privilege-more often than not, the offense was
merely criticism of the government, its policies, or its officers. The right was associated then
with guilt for crimes of conscience, of belief, and of association. In the broadest sense it was a
protection not of the guilty, or of the innocent, but of freedom of expression, of political
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historical analysis alone does not resolve disagreement over the reasons
for the self-incrimination privilege.6 As debate over the articulated and
functional rationales of the fifth amendment continues, 7 courts and
commentators have proffered numerous justifications to permit, to con-
tract, or to expand the privilege under various circumstances. No single
policy can support all invocations of the privilege. 8 As noted previ-
ously, Justice Goldberg set forth seven policies that the Court variously
had advanced to support the privilege.6 9 Judge Friendly reduced this
number to five.70 More recently, David O'Brien analyzed current juris-
prudential bases for the privilege against self-incrimination and con-
cluded that essentially three policies justify the modern privilege. These
three fundamental rationales largely explain the privilege as it exists
today.7'
First, the "fox hunter's" rationale posits a norm of fairness by anal-
ogizing the privilege to fair treatment of the fox in a hunt: similar to
the rules that delimit how hunters may take the fox, rules of privilege
and procedure determine fair prosecution of criminal defendants in our
accusatorial criminal justice system.72 Under this analysis historical
abuses, illustrated by the Star Chamber, the High Commission, and the
Inquisition, are avoided by establishing fairness between the state and
the individual-a fair fight between "equals meeting in battle. 7' The
liberty, of the right to worship as one pleased.
Id. Judge Friendly concurred that the privacy rationale supports the privilege when one's beliefs
and associations are threatened; but historically, privacy in the sense of wishing merely to conceal
one's criminal acts, cannot support invocations of privilege by rapists or murderers. Friendly,
supra note 60, at 696.
For further discussion of the history behind the privilege, see generally 8 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 55, § 2250, at 267 and O'Brien, supra note 58, at 29-35.
66. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 55, § 2251, at 295.
67. O'Brien, supra note 58, at 26.
68. See id. at 53-54.
69. See supra note 55. Goldberg's opinion in Murphy drew in large measure from Professor
Wigmore's treatise on Evidence. See 8 J. WmMORE, supra note 55, § 2251, at 297-318.
70. One rationale Judge Friendly accepted posits that the privilege also serves an equal pro-
tection function. See Friendly, supra note 60, at 697-98, 711. This purpose derives implicitly from
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), on the theory that the privilege accords unequal treat-
ment to poor and unsophisticated criminal suspects who, in contrast to wealthier suspects or pro-
fessional criminals, may not be aware they are permitted legally to remain silent. Because Miranda
warnings sufficiently fulfill this function, this policy has received scant attention. But cf. Thomp-
son, Judge Friendly's Amendment to the Fifth Amendment: A Comment on a Recent Criticism of
the Supreme Court, 38 U. CIN. L. REv. 488 (1969).
71. O'Brien, supra note 58, at 27, 28.
72. Id. at 36. Justice Fortas explained this rationale as a product of John Locke's social com-
pact theory of government. Fortes hypothesized that the individual had not yielded to the state
the power to "extract evidence of his own guilt." Friendly, supra note 60, at 692 (citing Fortas,
The Fifth Amendment: Nemo Tenetur Prodere Seipsum, 25 CLEV. BAJ. 91, 98-100 (1954)).
73. Friendly, supra note 60, at 693 (citing Fortas, supra note 72). Friendly criticized Justice
Fortas in his understanding of Locke's treatise and in his depiction of a criminal trial:
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privilege, therefore, exists not as an end in itself, but as a means of
securing a balance between the prosecution and the accused, thus en-
suring that the state will not abuse its awesome powers.74
The second widely accepted policy behind the privilege against
self-incrimination is based on society's reluctance to expose individuals
to "the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt"7 5 and
was described by Jeremy Bentham as the "old woman's reason. '7 6 Ben-
tham believed this trilemma was a poor excuse for logic. He reasoned
that a person naturally would not wish to incriminate himself because
that would lead to his punishment; but for a guilty defendant punish-
ment is his due.7 7 Despite Bentham's derogation of the old woman's ra-
tionale, the cruel trilemma has emerged as an accepted reason for
preserving the privilege against self-incrimination. Though in reality
the trilemma may be limited to two undesirable choices (self-accusation
and perjury),7 8 this rationale acknowledges fifth amendment respect for
individual moral sanctity as an independent basis for the privilege.7 9
Notwithstanding its acceptance, the cruel trilemma provides at
best an imperfect justification for the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. Requiring an individual to give testimony under a grant of immu-
nity diminishes the value of the privilege by interpreting the grant as
merely an opportunity not to incriminate oneself, rather than a politi-
cal right not to accuse oneself.80 The privilege thus may become con-
text-dependent, so that the individual, though no longer facing criminal
punishment, may be exposed to public humiliation and disgrace while
remaining ostensibly on equal footing with the state.8 ' Furthermore,
With all respect, this concept of a criminal trial as a jousting contest where the rules bear
equally on both participants and neither is expected to be of the slightest help to the other
has no relation to reality. No one... would wish it that way. The sovereign state must
affirmatively disclose any exculpatory evidence in its possession whereas the not so sovereign
individual need not.
Id. David O'Brien concurs, noting that while in theory, under the fox hunter's rationale the two
sides are "equal," in fact, because the fifth amendment confers only a privilege and not a right, the
state can grant the suspect immunity, force him to forfeit "privacy interests when personal disclo-
sures are self-accusatory but not self-incriminating," and jail him for contempt if he refuses.
O'Brien, supra note 58, at 39-40.
74. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 335 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
75. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
76. Bentham, A Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in 7 THE WORKs OF JEREMY BENTHAM 452
(Bowring ed. 1962).
77. Id.
78. Friendly, supra note 60, at 695 (stating: "I take it that almost no one would favor confin-
ing a man to jail until he takes the stand to testify to his own crime").
Judge Friendly nonetheless noted that the removal of the contempt horn did not remove the
problem of other sanctions, for instance, a negative inference or loss of employment. Id.
79. See O'Brien, supra note 58, at 43.




this justification may lead to a paradox: one seeks to withhold informa-
tion for which nondisclosure runs counter to moral and social norms.82
This paradox withers when one considers that the privilege against self-
incrimination represents the accepted legal norm when confronted in a
criminal investigation or at trial.83
The third rationale, developed more recently, assumes that confes-
sions procured through grants of immunity are grave encroachments on
privacy and must be considered serious.8 " Although Justice Goldberg
listed privacy as an important policy supporting the privilege against
self-incrimination, there is serious disagreement among commentators
regarding the ability of the privilege to safeguard witnesses' privacy. 5
Judge Friendly argued that it was not possible to harmonize the privacy
rationale as a principal justification for the privilege against self-incrim-
ination with immunity laws that require defendants to forego their pri-
vacy."6 Judge Friendly further questioned the moral justification that
allows a citizen to withhold assistance in resolving a murder, kidnap-
ping, or rape only because the citizen did not wish to be bothered and
preferred to remain in his "private enclave. ' 87 In his criticism, however,
Judge Friendly ignored the possibility that absolute noninterference is
not essential to reliance on the privacy rationale.88 The privacy ration-
ale serves to limit and to restrain intrusions by the state through ac-
cording respect to the moral independence of an individual's thoughts
and associations; yet, this rationale is not unqualified. When the policy
behind a limited intrusion of privacy is weightier than the moral princi-
ples supporting preservation of that privacy, the moral principles must
give way.89
These policy rationales rarely are independently sufficient to justify
the privilege against self-incrimination. Privacy, for instance, often is
82. See Friendly, supra note 60, at 680. Judge Friendly explained:
No parent would teach such a doctrine to his children; the lesson parents preach is that while
a misdeed, even a serious one, will generally be forgiven, a failure to make a clean breast of it
will not be. Every hour of the day people are being asked to explain their conduct to parents,
employers and teachers. Those who are questioned consider themselves to be morally bound
to respond, and the questioners believe it proper to take action if they do not.
Id. (footnote omitted).
83. See Thompson, supra note 70, at 500.
84. O'Brien, supra note 58, at 46.
85. Compare Friendly, supra note 60, with O'Brien, supra note 58, at 45-54.
86. Friendly, supra note 60, at 689 (quoting McKay, Self Incrimination and the New Pri-
vacy, 1967 Sup. CT. Rv. 193, 209).
87. Friendly, supra note 60, at 689.
88. O'Brien, supra note 58, at 53 (citing Friendly, supra note 60, at 689).
89. See id. at 53-54; see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 400-01 (1976) (stating:
"We cannot cut the [flifth [almendment completely loose from the moorings of its language and
make it serve as a general protector of privacy-a word not mentioned in its text and a concept
directly addressed in the [f]ourth [a]mendment").
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justifiable only when used to supplement one or both of the other policy
rationales; and the privilege is most defensible when all of the policies
mentioned lend some measure of support.9 0 The privilege serves impor-
tant policy interests and is worth preserving regardless of the status of
the witness claiming it.
2. Scope
a. General Parameters of the Privilege
The privilege against self-incrimination may be asserted by any
witness or party91 in any civil or criminal proceeding 92 whenever the
testimony sought would directly reveal a crime, or would "furnish a link
in the chain of evidence." 9 Exposure to civil liability alone, however,
will not support an invocation of the privilege. 4 The privilege may be
invoked in response to questions at trial 5 or in depositions, 96 or in re-
fusing to answer a complaint 97 or to respond to interrogatories. 8 A wit-
ness subpoenaed for documents may assert the privilege when
production would authenticate, establish possession or control over, or
simply reveal the existence of the documents.9 Blanket invocations of
the privilege, however, generally are not allowed; instead, the witness
must invoke question-by-question.0 0
Realistically, if the witness faces at least a remote possibility of
prosecution, the claim of privilege will be upheld.' 0 ' The invoking wit-
90. See O'Brien, supra note 53, at 53-54.
91. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924).
92. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972); McCarthy, 266 U.S. at 40.
93. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
94. United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 125 (1980).
95. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 444-45.
96. Duffy v. Currier, 291 F. Supp. 810, 815 (D. Minn. 1968).
97. National Acceptance Co. v. Bathalter, 705 F.2d 924, 926-28 (7th Cir. 1983); DeAntonio v.
Solomon, 42 F.R.D. 320, 322 (D. Mass. 1967).
98. United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7 (1970); Paul Harrigan & Sons, Inc. v. Enterprise
Animal Oil Co., 14 F.R.D. 333, 334 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
99. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976). The Court wrote that questions of
whether the "tacit averments" of conceding the existence, control, or possession of documents were
"testimonial" and "incriminating" for fifth amendment purposes, did "not lend themselves to cate-
gorical answers." Compare Abramowitz & Rakoff, The Fifth Amendment Privilege in Civil Litiga-
tion: Assertion, Waiver and Consequences, 130 P.L.L LTGATION & ADMIN. PRAc. SEREmS 59, 61-62
(1983) with Litt, Discovery in Civil RICO Actions, and the Fifth Amendment, 141 PL.I LrrGA-
TON & ADMIN. PRAC. SERms 183, 190-92 (1986).
For an excellent discussion of the Fisher doctrine, see Mosteller, Simplifying Subpoena Law:
Taking the Fifth Amendment Seriously, 73 VA. L. REv. 1 (1987).
100. National Life Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 615 F.2d 595, 599 (3d Cir.
1980); Hudson Tire Mart, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 518 F.2d 671, 674 (2d Cir. 1975).
101. See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968); In re Master Key Litigation, 507
F.2d 292, 293 (9th Cir. 1974).
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ness is not required to reveal his response to the court, even in camera,
for this would relinquish the protections the privilege is intended to
afford.102 Thus, despite the Court's assertion that the witness's own dec-
laration is insufficient to gain the sanctity of the privilege, 03 it is quite
difficult to challenge successfully most invocations. 0 4
The privilege is limited to natural persons 05 and normally may not
be asserted on another's behalf. 06 If not asserted, the privilege is
deemed waived, although there is a strong presumption against waiver
of constitutional rights.107 When the witness is granted immunity, how-
ever, he loses the right to assert the privilege for the matter immunized,
must respond to those questions that reveal his criminality or invade
his privacy, and may face contempt should he refuse. 08
b. Civil Invocations and the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has had numerous occasions to consider the
price that may be exacted from one who chooses to invoke the privilege.
In criminal cases the Court has held that prosecutors may not comment
upon or insinuate that silence or invocation of the privilege by a de-
fendant indicates guilt. 09 When requested, the criminal defendant is
entitled specifically to a jury instruction to this effect.110 In civil cases"'
102. Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486.
103. Id. at 486.
104. The witness asserting the privilege is given the benefit of the doubt. See Abramowitz &
Rakoff, supra note 99, at 67-68; see also Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 488 (stating that "[i]n this setting it
was not 'perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that the
witness is mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot possibly have such tendency' to incriminate"
(emphasis in original) (citation omitted)).
105. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Bellis v. United States,
417 U.S. 85, 89-90 (1974); George Campbell Painting Corp. v. Reid, 392 U.S. 286, 288-89 (1968).
106. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 22, § 120, at 289.
107. See Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 657 (1976); United States v. Mandujano, 425
U.S. 564, 584 (1976); Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 480-81
(1972); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 276 (1968); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475
(1966); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
108. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). In Kastigar the Court held that
grants of immunity that provided protection broader than the fifth amendment privilege were not
constitutionally required. Thus, a grant of use immunity (preventing the use of compelled testi-
mony and any evidence revealed therefrom) was sufficient to compel the witness to testify, making
it unnecessary to extend transactional immunity (immunity from prosecution of the crimes re-
vealed by the testimony) in many cases. Id. at 453.
If a witness is forced erroneously to testify, however, equity demands that the witness be given
immunity from subsequent prosecution. Heidt, The Conjurer's Circle-The Fifth Amendment
Privilege in Civil Cases, 91 YALE L.J. 1062, 1100 (1982).
109. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 612-14 (1965).
110. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 300 (1981).
111. Though some of these cases are in fact criminal appeals, e.g. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385
U.S. 493 (1967), they set forth the law applicable to invocations or waivers resulting from threats
of civil liability.
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the Court has moved toward allowing substantive consequences to fol-
low when witnesses invoke the privilege in response to non-criminating
threats of compulsion.
As a general matter, the Court has ruled that certain burdens are
unconstitutional because they make exercise of the privilege too costly.
Thus, in Garrity v. State of New Jersey police officers forced to choose
between waiving the privilege or losing their jobs had their convictions
for "fixing" traffic tickets reversed.112 In Spevack v. Klein the Supreme
Court held that an attorney under investigation for professional mis-
conduct could not be disbarred because he relied on the privilege in
refusing to produce subpoenaed records or to testify at the hearing on
the matter. 1 3
Following these decisions, the Court in Gardner v. Broderick rein-
stated a police officer who was fired after refusing to waive the immu-
nity to which he would have been entitled if forced to testify despite his
privilege."' Justice Fortas noted, however, that if the officer had not
been forced to waive his immunity against prosecution, yet persisted in
refusing to answer specific questions relating directly to his duties as an
officer, then the privilege would not have barred his dismissal."' 5
Justice Harlan, concurring in Gardner, lauded this procedure by
which those who invoke the privilege, but are not forced to choose be-
tween some benefit such as their employment and their fifth amend-
ment privilege, constitutionally may face reasonable consequences.
Judge Friendly later criticized the Court for acting in an ad hoc fashion
in these cases, rather than setting forth uniform principles to guide the
112. Id. at 497 (reasoning that "[tihe option to lose their means of livelihood or to pay the
penalty of self-incrimination is the antithesis of free choice to speak out or to remain silent").
113. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 516 (1967) (holding that "[t]he threat of disbarment and
the loss of professional standing, professional reputation, and of livelihood are powerful forms of
compulsion to make a lawyer relinquish the privilege").
The dissenters in each of these five-to-four plurality opinions argued that these waivers were
not involuntary in any real sense. The states' threatened sanctions did not amount to compulsion
because the logical consequences were constitutionally permissible, and without such sanctions,
other important public values would be harmed. Justice Harlan stated:
The Court has not before held that the Federal Government and the States are forbidden to
permit any consequences to result from a claim of the privilege; it has instead recognized that
such consequences may vary widely in kind and intensity, and that these differences warrant
individual examination both of the hazard, if any, offered to the essential purposes of the
privilege, and of the public interests protected by the consequence.
Id. at 525 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
114. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
In Uniformed Sanitation Men Association v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280 (1968),
decided the same day as Gardner, the Court reversed the Second Circuit which had upheld dismis-
sal of sanitation department employees investigated for diverting the fees charged to private
cartmen for use of city landfill facilities. The employees were presented the same job-or-privilege
option faced by the officers in Gardner.
115. Gardner, 392 U.S. at 278.
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lower courts. 16 Judge Friendly argued that, realistically, the threat of
lost government employment or professional standing was undoubtedly
more compulsive than light criminal penalties. These cases, however,
indicated a willingness to allow non-criminating costs to accompany the
privilege, so long as they did not attach automatically. 117 Three subse-
quent decisions affirmed this analysis.""
In the most important of these decisions, Baxter v. Palmigiano,"9
the Court held that a prisoner's exercise of his privilege against self-
incrimination at a disciplinary proceeding could be used inferentially
against him by the Disciplinary Board. 20 The Court noted that the
state had not sought to use Palmigiano's silence against him criminally,
nor were any such proceedings pending. The Baxter Court distin-
guished the Garrity-Lefkowitz line of cases by noting that in each case
threats of significant economic retaliation followed automatically upon
invocation of the privilege.' 21 In contrast, Palmigiano's silence did not
trigger a finding of guilt automatically, nor could his silence alone sus-
tain the Board's decision. 122 The majority concluded that inferences are
allowed by the fifth amendment in civil cases in which the privilege is
asserted by a party. 23
Particularly significant in Baxter was the dissent written by Justice
Brennan and joined by Justice Marshall. They dissented from the hold-
116. Friendly, supra note 60, at 707.
117. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 22, § 121, at 294-95.
118. See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977) (in which a statute that automati-
cally divested a political party officer of his post and further disqualified him for five years upon
refusal to appear before a grand jury and waive immunity for later prosecution concerning conduct
in office was held unconstitutional); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976) (in which a pris-
oner's refusal to testify at a disciplinary hearing raised an inference that factfinders could consider,
among other factors, in assessing guilt); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973) (in which a New
York statute requiring contractors to waive immunity and furnish possibly incriminating testi-
mony or face automatic disqualification as public contractors was held unconstitutional).
119. 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
120. The Court's decision depended upon its implicit holding, right or wrong, that these were
not criminal proceedings and therefore would not run afoul of the No-Comment rule of Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). The Baxter majority stated that "[d]isciplinary proceedings in
state prisons, however, involve the correctional process and important state interests other than
conviction for crime." Baxter, 425 U.S. at 319. In any event, whether or not the Court should have
extended the Griffin rule to prison disciplinary cases is not essential to its holding on adverse
inferences in civil cases.
121. Baxter, 425 U.S. at 316-17.
122. Id. at 317-18. Additionally, the Court pointed out that "as far as this record reveals, his
silence was given no more evidentiary value than was warranted by the facts surrounding his case."
Id.
Subsequent to Baxter, the Eighth Circuit noted in affirming the discharge of a postal service
employee, "the disciplinary action, whatever it may be, may not be based exclusively on the em-
ployee's failure to testify but it must be demonstrated by independent evidence that it is war-
ranted." Book v. United States Postal Serv., 675 F.2d 158, 160 n.4 (8th Cir. 1982).
123. Baxter, 425 U.S. at 318 (citing 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 55, § 2272, at 439).
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ing that inferences could be drawn against prisoners in favor of the
Government, regardless of whether any criminal charges were pend-
ing. 12 Justice Brennan chastised the majority for what he regarded as a
failed attempt to distinguish the Garrity-Lefkowitz line of cases, focus-
ing first on the severity of the sanctions and second, on the fact that the
Government was the party which put Palmigiano to the Hobson's
choice. 12 According to Justice Brennan, the penalty facing Palmigiano,
although not automatic, was as much a threat to the prisoner as those
burdens faced in prior cases, such as in Garrity.26 Justice Brennan
stated later in the opinion, however, that he "would have difficulty"
finding the inferences impermissible in civil litigation not involving the
Government as a party. 27 Thus, even Justices Brennan and Marshall
would allow inferences to befall private civil litigants because the Gov-
ernment would not be a party.
Despite Justice Brennan's criticism that the Baxter majority dealt
insufficiently with earlier precedent, the Supreme Court nonetheless af-
firmed its distinction between automatic and permissive sanctions in
non-criminal matters.' 28 Thus, in determining civil culpability, the fifth
amendment does not prohibit the factfinder from drawing adverse in-
ferences about the party who invokes the privilege in response to rele-
vant questions.'29 The factfinder must have discretion to reject the
inference, and a verdict unfavorable to the invoking party must be sup-
ported by other evidence. In civil cases, permissive adverse inferences
only have a slight effect on the privilege against self-incrimination,'"0
thus reflecting the Court's implicit judgment that, in some circum-
stances, allowing adverse inferences will increase the probability of fair
trials and advance justice."'
124. Id. at 327.
125. Id. at 328-36. Palmigiano faced a downgrade in classification and 30 days in punitive
segregation. Id. at 331.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 334.
128. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977). The Court stated:
Baxter did no more than permit an inference to be drawn in a civil case from a party's refusal
to testify. Respondent's silence in Baxter was only one of a number of factors to be consid-
ered by the finder of fact in assessing a penalty, and was given no more probative value than
the facts of the case warranted; here, refusal to waive the Fifth Amendment privilege leads
automatically and without more to imposition of sanctions.
Id. at 808 n.5.
129. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 22, § 121, at 295.
130. Id. The inference does not force a witness to incriminate himself. Because the Court has
held that exposure to civil liability alone cannot sustain the privilege, any impairment is not of
constitutional dimension.
131. Daskal, Assertion of the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Federal
Civil Litigation: Rights and Remedies, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 243, 263 (1980).
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3. Abuses of the Privilege
The privilege is susceptible to abuse because it is pleaded so easily.
Despite an often remote chance of prosecution, settled policy choices
render erosion of the privilege in the criminal arena unlikely." 2 On the
civil side, however, even when there is little chance of prosecution,
claims of privilege may function to frustrate discovery, or worse, to
block altogether the ability to prove one's case. 133 One commentator has
noted that in civil matters involving only private parties, present fifth
amendment interpretation sacrifices the search for truth, the policies
behind broad discovery, and the "vindication of public and private
rights" to an extent few comprehend.13 '
In addition to the broad range of invocations noted above that may
frustrate a plaintiff in a civil suit, employees or officers of a corporate
defendant may invoke the privilege individually and, thereby, conceal
information belonging to the corporation from the other parties. If the
corporation is not penalized somehow for failing to disclose this infor-
mation, the effect is to give the corporation a privilege it does not
have.13 5 When the corporation, despite its efforts to do so, cannot find
an agent or employee who can respond to discovery without incriminat-
ing himself, the plaintiff may be without remedy.13 6
Thus, tactics that enable witnesses to invoke the privilege can be
"potent weapon[s]" for defendants. 13 7 Not only can these tactics cause
increased expense and delay to plaintiffs, they ultimately may result in
132. The switch from transactional to use immunity illustrates one change; but the policies
behind the privilege discussed above, particularly the fox hunter and cruel trilemma policies,
render such cutback on the Griffin No-Comment rule unlikely.
133. See Heidt, supra note 108, at 1066 (stating that "[t]he privilege may be used even if the
invokers realize, as a practical matter, that they would not be prosecuted for the conduct they
would otherwise be forced to reveal").
In SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), the court drew adverse inferences
against two defendants in the context of a preliminary injunction against further violations of the
Securities and Exchange Act. Here, a law firm administrator had tipped two bond traders, among
others, as to pending takeovers. In drawing the negative inferences against the traders, the court
noted:
In instances of insider trading, where the nature of the violation makes the proof inherently
difficult to obtain, assertion of the privilege may lead to a complete failure of proof....
[S]uch a defense strategy clearly cripples plaintiff's efforts to conduct meaningful discovery
and to marshall proof in an expeditious fashion, if at all.
Id. at 429; see also In re Master Key Litigation, 507 F.2d 292, 293 (9th Cir. 1974).
134. Heidt, supra note 108, at 1064.
135. In re Anthracite Coal Antitrust Litig., 82 F.R.D. 364 (1979).
136. Heidt, supra note 108, at 1068. Professor Heidt writes that "[h]ow often such a case
arises is unclear." Id. at n.27. But cf. Casson Constr. Co., Inc. v. Armo Steel Corp., 91 F.R.D. 376
(D. Kan. 1980) (in which a default judgment was granted against a corporation whose employees
asserted the fifth amendment in response to interrogatories and which asserted that no employee
could be nominated who could respond without incriminating himself).
137. Heidt, supra note 108, at 1065.
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the inability of plaintiffs to prove valid claims.138 Even without overt
collusion between a party and a witness with whom that party may be
associated, the result of these invocations of privilege may be to thwart
the adverse party in gaining relief.'3 9 The ultimate objectionable conse-
quence of such abuse is the substantial denial of access to justice'40 and
doubtlessly was beyond the framers' intent in drafting the privilege.
This abusive conduct is reminiscent of the maligned "sporting theory"
of justice disposed of by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Little was done in the past to curb abusive invocations by defend-
ants because they are in court involuntarily,' 4 ' but recent trends indi-
cate that civil defendants will face consequences more often when they
invoke the privilege. Until recently, many courts also responded inade-
quately to invocations of the privilege by plaintiffs. 4" The Ninth Cir-
cuit in Lyons v. Johnson143 dismissed the plaintiff's civil rights action
because she refused to cooperate with discovery by invoking the fifth
amendment.4" Approaching the problem differently, the Fifth Circuit
in Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting System'45 agreed with the Ninth
Circuit that the plaintiff could not use the fifth amendment as both a
shield and a sword, but held that the denial of legal process to pursue a
valid claim was too great a price for exercising a constitutional right. 46
The Wehling court held that the plaintiff had due process rights to ad-
138. Id. at 1082.
139. Frequently, nonparty corporate employees represented by the company's lawyers, or
whose legal expenses are reimbursed by their employer, are advised to assert their privilege
broadly.
140. Heidt, supra note 108, at 1082.
141. Kaminsky, Preventing Unfair Use of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Pri-
vate Civil Litigation: A Critical Analysis, 39 BROOKLYN L. REV. 121, 144 (1972); see also Comment,
Penalizing the Civil Litigant Who Invokes the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, U. FLA. L.
REv. 541, 549 (1972).
142. See, e.g., Daskal, supra note 131; Note, Toward A Rational Treatment of Plaintiffs
Who Invoke the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination During Discovery, 66 IowA L. REV. 575
(1981).
143. 415 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1027 (1970).
144. Id. at 542. The court stated:
[Plaintiff's] obtaining of this shield, however, could not provide a sword to her for achieving
assertion of her claims against the defendants without having to conform to the processes
necessary to orderly and equal forensic functioning .... The scales of justice would hardly
remain equal in these respects, if a party can assert a claim against another and then be able
to block all discovery attempts against him by asserting a Fifth Amendment privilege to any
interrogation whatsoever upon his claim. If any prejudice is to come from such a situation, it
must, as a matter of basic fairness in the purposes and concepts on which the right of litiga-
tion rests, be to the party asserting the claim and not to the one who has been subjected to its
assertion. It is the former who has made the election to create imbalance in the pans of the
scales.
145. 608 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1979).
146. Id. at 1087.
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judicate his civil claims in a court of law4" and that forcing the plaintiff
to choose between those due process rights and the fifth amendment
was "constitutionally impermissible.' ' 148 After stating that the defend-
ant had no absolute right to dismissal whenever the plaintiff invoked
the privilege and that the plaintiff had no absolute right both to his
claim of privilege and to his suit, the court opted for a balancing ap-
proach. The court found that the proper remedy in this case was a pro-
tective order to stay discovery until the statute of limitations ran on the
potential prosecution. 149
Parties are not alone in flouting the policies and purposes behind
liberal discovery and the privilege against self-incrimination. Nonparty
witnesses also may invoke the privilege and similarly defeat the quest
for truth that is at the core of civil litigation. When a nonparty invoca-
tion of the privilege is seriously detrimental to a party, such that it
threatens the party's ability to reach the jury, remedies should be af-
forded to strike a balance of interests among the invoking witness, the
plaintiff, and the defendant to the lawsuit, yet provide assistance to the
litigant whose case is "stymied" by the privilege. 50 Various alternatives
exist to overcome the effects of nonparty invocation of the privilege, but
as with party invocations of the privilege, the adverse inference is
emerging as a particularly useful solution. When appropriately and
wisely used, adverse inferences can negate the stone wall erected by
abusive invocations of the privilege. Adverse inferences, however, are
not the panacea to rectify all invocations of the privilege. In some in-
stances, fairness simply dictates that claims of privilege be kept from
the jury. The following section surveys possible remedies when nonpar-
ties invoke the privilege 151 and concludes with an examination of the
adverse inference remedy.
147. Id. at 1087-88.
148. Id. at 1087.
149. Id. at 1089. According to the Fifth Circuit, the district court never suggested that the
length of the statute was important to ruling on the motion for a stay. The appellate court noted
that "a three-year hiatus in the lawsuit is undesirable from the standpoint of both the court and
the defendant," but that implementing this option was preferable to forcing the plaintiff to elect
between his lawsuit and his constitutional privilege. Id.
In addition, the court noted that should this remedy compromise the defendants' ability to
defend the lawsuit, other appropriate remedies could be fashioned. Id.
150. Heidt, supra note 108, at 1087. If the witness is closely aligned with a party, as for
instance a corporate officer or employee, it is not unfair to charge that party with sanctions as if
the party itself had invoked the privilege. Id.
151. Many of these same remedies are used when parties invoke the privilege, but the em-
phasis here is their use to remedy nonparty invocations.
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4. Efforts to Control Abuses of the Privilege
Commentators disagree widely over what, if anything, should be
done when nonparty witnesses assert the fifth amendment privilege in
civil suits and cause one side's case to suffer.152 Determining the proper
remedy for a particular case depends on context, and because no solu-
tion can serve all cases, a range of alternatives must be available. 53
Most attempts to blunt the effects of present or anticipated invocations
of the privilege lie, logically enough, between the extremes of doing
nothing or dismissing a case due to equitable considerations or failure
of proof. Despite their differing approaches to resolving nonparty invo-
cations of the privilege, commentators are in agreement that the least
severe alternatives that account for the interests of all involved should
be preferred.""
Initially, because the government is not involved in private civil lit-
igation, most remedial measures to counter the effects of nonparty invo-
cations of the privilege will not upset the policies underlying the fifth
amendment.' 55 The pre-eminent concern of an invoking nonparty wit-
ness is likely to be his ability to avoid the cruel trilemma; and, on this
basis alone, the full scope of the privilege must be preserved for the
witness. 56 If after careful consideration the equities in a case dictate
using a remedy that nonetheless seems unfair given the usual expecta-
tions of the adversary system, one must remember that the defendant is
alleged to have unjustifiably injured his opponent.'5 7
Professor Robert Heidt correctly urges rejection of a number of
remedies proposed to avert the effects of civil invocations of the privi-
lege. First, Heidt suggests that courts should avoid raising the Hoffman
152. Swagart, The Fifth Amendment Privilege in Corporate Litigation, 7 LITIGATION 22
(Summer 1981). The author writes of discovery invocations, but the damage is certainly as great
when witnesses invoke the privilege before the trial jury.
153. Daskal, supra note 131, at 269; Kaminsky, supra note 141, at 153.
154. See, e.g., O'Brien, Judicial Responses When a Civil Litigant Exercises a Privilege:
Seeking the Least Costly Remedy, 31 ST. Louis U.L.J. 323 (1987); see also Daskal, supra note 131,
at 267; Hartwell & Kenyon, Reconciling Fifth Amendment Claims and the Factfinding Process in
Civil Antitrust Litigation, 26 ANTITRUST BULL. 633, 646 (1981); Kaminsky, supra note 141, at 153;
Note, supra note 142, at 595.
155. Heidt, supra note 108, at 1084; see also Kaminsky, supra note 141, at 127, 148; cf.
Hughes Tool Co. v. Meier, No. C71-72 (D. Utah Mar. 28, 1978) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
In a suit in which the court drew an adverse inference against the defendant based on an assertion
of privilege, the Meier court noted: "This lawsuit involves purely private parties and seeks per-
sonal liability against an individual. And even though there may well have been significant crimi-
nal activity on the part of defendant Meier relating to the transaction out of which this action
arises, this is not the concern of this court." Id.
156. Heidt, supra note 108, at 1087.
157. Kaminsky, supra note 141, at 148. Such reasoning applies equally well when the effect
of some remedy seems unfair against the plaintiff, such as when he is pressing a bad claim or is
acting as a counterclaim defendant.
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threshold either by denying the privilege to witnesses who cannot show
a realistic probability of prosecution, or by requiring the invoker clearly
to demonstrate how responses would incriminate him if in fact he were
prosecuted. If the invoker testifies after a prior grant of use immunity,
the burden of proving no use of the compelled responses in a later pros-
ecution is nearly impossible; yet, if a court compels answers under these
circumstances, functionally it is granting use immunity without ap-
proval by the prosecutor. 158 Judges rarely can predict with confidence
that the chance of prosecution is so remote as to be disregarded,159 or
that prosecution would not be sought for other crimes revealed by a
compelled response. 60
Similarly, requiring a clearer presentation of how the invoker's
compelled response would assist a prosecutor disregards the fifth
amendment's firmly rooted recognition of the need to protect broadly
against incriminating responses. Requiring the invoker to demonstrate
to some relative, undefined extent just how incriminating his response
might be would necessitate replacing certainty with a loose, nebulous
standard. The Hoffman standard, by comparison, was marked by con-
sistency: the invoker almost always prevailed in his privilege.' 6 '
Second, Heidt maintains that protective orders are incapable of
providing the remedy needed to counter effects of invocations of the
privilege because they cannot ensure protection equivalent to the privi-
lege itself. The premise of this remedy is that by granting an order seal-
ing discovery from disclosure to the Government, the witness will be
induced to give testimony. The fallacy behind a protective order's effec-
tiveness is apparent when reminded that the order does not compel re-
sponses, and when facing a genuine threat of prosecution, a witness is
still likely to rely on the privilege. Furthermore, despite the order, the
likelihood that prosecutors will gain access to the information is
strong."' At best this solution provides temporary protection to incrim-
inating testimony and is not available for invocations of the privilege at
trial.' 63
A third solution proposed when fair trials are impeded by invoca-
158. Heidt, supra note 108, at 1091.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1092.
161. Id. at 1094.
162. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468 (4th Cir.) (stating that a Grand Jury
subpoena preempted a civil protective order insulating transcripts of third party deponents, irre-
spective of the deponents' insistence that, but for the order, they would have asserted the fifth
amendment privilege and refused to give testimony), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2914 (1988).
163. See Heidt, supra note 108, at 1095. Professor Heidt states: "The court can hardly hold
all proceedings-including the trial and the appeal-in secret, seal all records indefinitely, and
prevent all participants from supplying information to the government." Id.
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tions of privilege is for the court to grant the invoker use immunity and
thereby remove the threat of prosecution. Superficially, this option is
appealing and is required when witnesses are compelled erroneously to
respond despite their assertions of privilege.1 64 Such attempts by trial
courts to force testimony, however, are clear encroachments into the
executive branch prerogative to prosecute.' Heidt points out that
when courts grant immunity without a legislative grant to do so, the
private litigants are benefited but the public may be disserved.' 6e
Another possible remedy, not mentioned by Heidt, would be to fol-
low the Fifth Circuit's approach in Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting
System.'6 7 In Wehling discovery was stayed until the plaintiff no longer
faced the threat of prosecution. Although this option may be proper
when parties invoke the privilege during discovery and the statute of
limitations is close to expiration, it would be an undesirable remedy for
trial invocations or invocations by nonparties. This remedy would cause
increased expense to the parties and delay, perhaps by years, their day
in court. For these reasons no court in a reported decision has stayed
litigation to counterbalance the effects of invocation of the privilege by
a nonparty witness. 68
164. Id. at 1100.
165. Id. at 1100-02; Baylson, The Fifth Amendment in Civil Antitrust Litigation: Overview
of Substantive Law, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 837, 841 (1982).
166. Heidt, supra note 108, at 1100-02. Professor Heidt terms the fourth option that he re-
jects the "Prospective Taint Fantasy." Parties desiring testimony from witnesses previously
granted use immunity have argued that the prior immunization "taints" the witnesses' testimony
because the parameters and areas of inquiry in the civil examination were products of the immu-
nity, thus preventing prosecutorial use of the later civil responses. Because the present testimony
cannot be used criminally, the witness should be compelled to respond. The appeal behind the
argument is strong because the prior decision to immunize renders rather slim the chance of a later
prosecution. Nonetheless, because this possibility remains, the Supreme Court in Pillsbury v. Con-
boy, 459 U.S. 248 (1983), definitively rejected this argument to compel the invoker to respond. But
see Comment, Constitutional Law-Fifth Amendment: Civil Deposition Testimony Not Automat-
ically Immunized and Hence May Not Be Compelled Over Deponent's Valid Assertion of Fifth
Amendment Privilege-Pillsbury v. Conboy, 103 S. Ct. 608 (1983), 14 SETON HALL L. REv. 417, 430
(1984) (arguing that by refusing to compel use-immunized witnesses to testify in later civil cases,
the Court "has closed off the litigants' major avenue to obtain evidence").
167. 608 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1979).
168. One further remedy suggested when witnesses rely on the privilege in refusing to coop-
erate with discovery, only to waive invocation and attempt to testify at trial, is to continue pro-
ceedings until the previous invoker can be deposed. Belated discovery, however, often is
inadequate or even impossible, and lengthy delays between the act sued upon and the trial can
render this "solution" nearly worthless. Such delays generally are much more beneficial to defend-
ants than plaintiffs. When the "midnight witness" is a party, solutions range from precluding his
testimony to striking pleadings that relate to the invocation to entering judgment against the
party, depending on the egregiousness of the conduct. An alternative response when the witness,
party, or corroborated nonparty elects to testify on the eve of trial, after previously asserting the
privilege, is to inform the factfinder of this strategy and permit it to weigh the reasons. See Heidt,
supra note 108, at 1130-32; Kaminsky, supra note 141, at 149-51. In light of cases such as Wehling,
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The privilege against self-incrimination often has a negative impact
in civil litigation. Unexpected invocations of privilege may "send shock
waves" through a trial. e16  As noted, the ranks split over the correct re-
sponse, but the most notably effective and equitable remedy to more
serious impairments of a fair trial is informing the factfinder and al-
lowing that body to draw such inferences as are suggested in light of all
the proof by the invocation of the privilege.
In a significant article written over thirty years ago, John Noonan
stated that not only were the policies of the privilege not offended
whenever inferences drawn against a witness's invocation of the privi-
lege were used for purposes other than criminal conviction, 170 but also
that if a witness invoked the privilege to avoid an incriminating answer,
he implied an inculpatory response.171 Had the witness's response been
exculpatory, it would not have provided the link in the chain of evi-
dence required by Hoffman.L72
Noonan's interpretation of invocations of privilege that seek to
permitting this adverse inference, which allows consideration of sincerity and credibility, is the
arguably better response.
169. Swagart, supra note 152, at 22.
170. Noonan, Inferences From the Invocation of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
41 VA. L. REv. 311, 319 (1955).
171. Id. at 322.
172. Id. at 323. Though overstated, there is logic here. A criminal defendant needs only mo-
tives to refuse to testify, ranging from fear of exposing prior criminal behavior to protection of
friends to avoidance of prejudicial impressions due to physical or mental defects such as "his hang-
dog physiognomy, speech or language defect, stupidity, timidity, or unattractiveness." Id. at 320.
On the other hand, a nondefendant witness must have legal justifications for invoking. Id. Admit-
tedly the Court set a low standard by indicating that an innocent person might invoke the privi-
lege when suspicious circumstances could misguide a prosecutor into bringing charges against him.
See Slochower v. Board of Higher Ed., 350 U.S. 551, 557-58 (1956). The Slochower Court stated
that "a witness may have a reasonable fear of prosecution and yet be innocent of any wrongdoing.
The privilege serves to protect the innocent who otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous cir-
cumstances." Id.; see Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981) (stating that if requested, a criminal
trial judge has a constitutional obligation to give a "no adverse inference" instruction to reduce the
possibility that jurors will infer guilt from the defendant's silence); Grunewald v. United States,
353 U.S. 391, 421-22 (1957) (stating that an invocation of privilege before a grand jury is wholly
consistent with an assertion of innocence at trial-"one of the basic functions of the privilege is to
protect innocent men" (emphasis in original)). But cf. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382
U.S. 406, 415 (1966). In declining to give retroactive effect to the Griffin No-Comment rule, the
Court stated that "the basic purposes that lie behind the privilege ... do not relate to protecting
the innocent from conviction, but rather to preserving the integrity of a judicial system in which
even the guilty are not to be convicted unless the prosecution 'shoulder the entire load.'" Id.
Though Judge Friendly stated that this "protection of the innocent" rationale "has been repu-
diated by the Court" and implied that the need for expanding the scope of privilege, illustrated by
decisions such as Slochower, had waned (having been timely responses to McCarthyism), it re-
mains that some witnesses still invoke the privilege, legitimately, for this reason. Friendly, supra
note 60, at 671, 695. Juries, recognizing that the numbers of these invocations are quite few, tend
to associate all invocations with culpable conduct. See V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY
144 (1986).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
avoid incrimination may be partly accurate, but his interpretation is
entirely incorrect when an innocent person invokes the privilege fearing
prosecution because of suspicious circumstances. Because the witness
may be interrogated only within a very limited scope about why he is
invoking the privilege, many commentators insist that any invocation of
the privilege is ambiguous and therefore meaningless as evidence. Fur-
ther, if the witness is not a party, it seems unfair to allow the judge or
jury to draw a negative inference against one of the litigants. These is-
sues illustrate the two principal evidentiary objections to permitting the
use of adverse inferences based on nonparty invocations of the
privilege.
Numerous commentators have asserted that because invocations of
the privilege cannot be cross-examined rigorously, they are ambiguous,
speculative, and noncommunicative of facts and therefore should be ex-
cluded on grounds of relevancy and prejudice.173 Although many of
these commentators admit that invocations of the privilege hinder dis-
covery and often handicap the parties at trial, 174 these commentators
would ignore such consequences and opt for avoiding mention of the
invocation, regardless of the effect. For instance, in a leading article
taking this position, Ray Hartwell notes the serious effects of invoca-
tions of the privilege on litigation, but discounts the invocations' legal
relevancy, even when made by agents and employees of a party.17 5 As-
suming that fifth amendment claims may have "some probative
value," 1 6 Hartwell argues that any relevance is grossly offset by prohib-
itive confusion and prejudice should the claims be admitted as
evidence.
173. See E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE (J. Weinstein ed.
1976); Hartwell, supra note 2; Hartwell & Kenyon, Reconciling Fifth Amendment Claims and the
Factfinding Process in Civil Antitrust Litigation, 26 ANTITRUST BULL. 633 (1981); Morrison, Com-
mentary, Availability of Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Permis-
sibility of Drawing Adverse Inferences: Alternative Perspectives, 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 1421 (1980);
Note, Non-Party Witnesses' Invocation of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in a Civil
Case: Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. A & P Steel, Inc., 18 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1243 (1985) [hereinafter
Note, Rosebud]; Note, Adverse Inferences Based on Non-Party Invocations: The Real Magic
Trick in Fifth Amendment Civil Cases, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 370 (1985) [hereinafter Note,
Magic Trick]; Comment, Third Circuit Court of Appeals Holds Evidence Admissible as Substan-
tive Evidence of Fact that Non-Party Witnesses Exercised Fifth Amendment Privilege Against
Compelling Self-Incrimination at Deposition: RAD Services, 31 TRIAL LAW. GUmE 134 (1987).
174. See, e.g., Hartwell & Kenyon, supra note 173, at 634 (stating that "fifth amendment
assertions by witnesses may impede or even preclude discovery on important issues, making proof
of the plaintiff's claims more difficult").
175. Id. at 649.
176. Id. at 658. Hartwell later characterizes the value of invocations as "dubious." Id. at 659.
177. Id. If the questions that trigger a claim of privilege are relevant to the case, it would
strain credibility for one to argue that such invocations are meaningless and ambiguous. Clearly,
they are not. The ambiguity argument usually seeks only to suppress evidence which would result
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In many cases, Hartwell's argument far overstates the prejudice to
the party affected negatively by the inference, while all but ignoring the
often more serious damage to the party stymied by the privilege when
the alternative to such an inference is to disregard the substantive ef-
fect of invocation. Realistically, all of one's evidence should advance
one's position and hurt one's opponent. Prejudice, therefore, requires
more than simply showing that the evidence "hurts. 1 78 Trials are held
to achieve fair adjudications on accurate facts, and probative value
measures the ability of evidence to advance this ideal. 7 9 The eviden-
tiary value of evidence to a jury, however, is measured by usefulness in
the context of all the evidence offered, not simply by the "intrinsic logi-
cal worth" of one piece of prejudicial evidence.180 Ambiguity, likewise, is
a function of what the evidence indicates in light of the case as a
whole."8
Hartwell notes correctly that if proof of the issue to which the wit-
ness invokes the privilege is available elsewhere, or if it simply is not
necessary to determining liability, then no adverse inferences should be
drawn from the invocation. 82 On the other hand, if a party's ability to
prove his case is placed at risk because a witness invokes the privilege,
the jury should be instructed and trusted to consider the invocation's
significance in the context presented.183
Another objection to adverse inferences based upon nonparty invo-
cations of the privilege is lack of control. Opponents of nonparty ad-
verse inferences argue that because only parties are obliged to come
forward with evidence to establish or to defend legal claims, witnesses
in losing the case. The real argument, which may be appropriate in some but not all adverse infer-
ence situations, is similar to the policies behind Rule 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
keeps out character evidence in proof of conduct. One author explains "[i]t is not that the jury will
use [this evidence] the wrong way. They will use it for exactly the right purpose. The danger is
that they may give it too much weight, so we keep it out." McElhaney, Arguing Relevance, 13
LITIGATION 57 (Winter 1987).
178. McElhaney, supra note 177, at 50; see also 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's
EVIDENCE 403[03], at 403-29 (1988) (explaining that "[v]irtually all evidence is prejudicial or it
isn't material. The prejudice must be 'unfair' ").
179. Gold, supra note 13, at 65.
180. Id. at 74.
181. See id. at 79. Professor Gold stated:
The ability of twelve laypersons to interject human sensibilities into a proceeding otherwise
dominated by the cold logic of the law may embody the true worth of the jury system. This
ability can add to rather than detract from accurate factfinding by advancing the jury's em-
pathic understanding of how and why the participants acted a particular way.
Id.
182. Hartwell & Kenyon, supra note 173, at 650.
183. Gold, supra note 13, at 74. Gold considers the relevancy context to include, among other
factors "the presence of other evidence that establishes the disputed fact, the relative strength of
the offeror's case, the difficulty of proving the fact in question, the importance of the fact in the
offeror's case, and the evidence offered by the opponent." Id. at 75 (footnotes omitted).
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who are beyond the parties' control and who independently decide to
invoke the privilege should not cause negative consequences to inure to
the parties.18 4 Lawyers recognize that a corporation's ability to control
agent and employee decisions to invoke the privilege ranges from "very
limited"'85 to "nonexistent."' 86 By taking a narrow view of corporate
accountability, these opponents seek to avoid the consequences of em-
ployee invocations by ignoring the fact that corporations can act only
through agents and employees. 87 Indeed, tactics have been proposed to
disassociate those connected with a corporate party in an effort to avoid
the logical and sometimes necessary inferences.188
The control argument has merit insofar as the invoker is a truly
independent, man-off-the-street type witness with no relationship or
connection to the party implicated by the inference. On the other hand,
if the witness can be identified or associated fairly with a party, close
consideration should be given to allowing the jury to draw inferences
from his invocation of the privilege. Though Professor Heidt notes that
factors indicating "some loyalty" to an employer defendant are useful
in reducing the possibility that a vindictive witness will lie and claim
that he has committed criminal acts for which the defendant is respon-
sible," 9 the absence of such factors should not necessarily bar the infer-
ence. 90 One commentator suggests that permissive inferences may be
warranted when nonparty witnesses invoke the privilege regarding is-
sues directly relating to liability,' 9 ' while another commentator, focus-
ing on the witness-party relationship, approves invocation-based
inferences when nonparty witnesses may be classified as a corporate of-
ficer, employee, managing agent, or designee under Rules 30(b)(6) or
184. Morrison, supra note 173, at 1425.
185. Hartwell, supra note 2, at 849 (present employees).
186. Id. (former employees).
187. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Mid-Valley, Inc., 763 F.2d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 1985).
188. ,See Hartwell, supra note 2, at 849 (recommending a four step plan to avoid inferences
through invocations by employees); Swagart, supra note 152, at 24 (setting forth five similar
suggestions).
189. Heidt, supra note 108, at 1119-20 n.214. The concern is for avoiding revengeful invoca-
tions that seek to saddle a defendant with liability by insinuation, particularly where the chance of
prosecution of the witness is slim. See also Note, Magic Trick, supra note 173, at 386 (implying
that vindictive ex-employees might invoke to discredit their ex-employers).
190. But see Rubin v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 18 F.R.D. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). The court
stated:
[Tihe employee should be a person who can be expected to identify himself with the interests
of the corporation rather than with those of the other parties. This requirement is necessary
because the testimony of a managing agent can be used by the other parties for any purpose
at the trial, and the corporation should not be bound by the testimony of persons who may
not be loyal to its interests.
Id. at 56.
191. Kaminsky, supra note 141, at 152.
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31(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.192 Still another commen-
tator suggests that inferences based on co-conspirator invocations might
be allowed. 9 '
Despite contrary assertions by the Advisory Committee to the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, lower courts have allowed adverse inferences
against party invokers for a long time,9 and there is authority sug-
gesting the same from older treatises.'95 When witnesses who are non-
192. Swagart, supra note 152, at 23.
193. Baylson, The Fifth Amendment in Civil Antitrust Litigation: Overview of Substantive
Law, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 837, 844 (1982).
194. See Proposed Rule 513, reprinted in 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 178,
513, at 513-1 (1982). Proposed Rule 513 states:
(a) Comment or inference not permitted. The claim of a privilege, whether in the present
proceeding or upon a prior occasion, is not a proper subject of comment by judge or counsel.
No inference may be drawn therefrom.
(b) Claiming privilege without knowledge of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be con-
ducted, to the extent practicable, so as to facilitate the making of claims of privilege without
the knowledge of the jury.
(c) Jury instruction. Upon request, any party against whom the jury might draw an adverse
inference from a claim of privilege is entitled to an instruction that no inference may be
drawn therefrom.
Id. The Advisory Committee's Note to subdivision (a) states that "the present subdivision forbids
comment upon the exercise of a privilege, in accord with the weight of authority." Id. at 513-2.
Several states have codified the Proposed Rule in their evidence codes. Id. 513[03], at 513-7. By
specific modification, however, Maine expressly forbids any adverse inference to accrue from invo-
cations by nonparty witnesses. MAINE R. Evm. 513(b), reprinted in WmNsTEIN's EVIDENCE, supra,
at 513-8.
Lower courts allowing adverse inferences based on party invocations include Paynes v. Lee,
362 F. Supp. 797 (M.D. La. 1973), aff'd, 487 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1974); In re De Gottardi, 114 F.
328 (S.D. Cal. 1902); Morris v. McClellan, 154 Ala. 639, 45 So. 641 (1908); Olin Corp. v. Castells,
180 Conn. 49, 428 A.2d 319 (1980); Ralph Hegman Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 293 Minn. 323,
198 N.W.2d 555 (1972); Marine Midland Bank v. John E. Russo Produce Co., 50 N.Y.2d 31, 405
N.E.2d 205, 427 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1980); Molloy v. Molloy, 46 Wis. 2d 682, 176 N.W.2d 292 (1970);
Grognet v. Fox Valley Trucking Serv., 45 Wis. 2d 235, 172 N.W.2d 812 (1969); see also Morgan v.
Kendall, 124 Ind. 454, 24 N.E. 143 (1890); Andrews v. Frye, 104 Mass. 234 (1870).
For federal post-Baxter cases, see: Arthurs v. Stem, 560 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1034 (1978); Pagel, Inc. v. SEC, 803 F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1986); SEC v. American Bd. of
Trade, Inc., 1986 Fed. See. L. Rptr. (CCH) 1 93,044 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); United States v. Ianniello,
646 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), af'd, 824 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1987); SEC v. Tome, 638 F. Supp.
629 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Penfield v. Venuti, 589 F. Supp. 250 (D. Conn. 1984); Fidelity Bankers Life
Ins. v. Wedco, 586 F. Supp. 1123 (D. Nev. 1984); SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y.
1984); Winterland Concessions Co. v. Sileo, 528 F. Supp. 1201 (N.D. IM. 1981); and In re Crabtree,
39 Bankr. 718 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984).
195. See B. JONES, CoMmrdNTAnms ON THE LAW OP EVIDENCE IN CIViL CASES § 891, at 359-60
(1914). Professor Jones stated:
The question of the making of a bona fide claim to privilege is entitled to great consideration
by reason of its moral effect upon the jury. It has frequently been held that, in order to make
the privilege of any value, no unfavorable inference should be drawn from the refusal of a
witness to answer a question because it may tend to criminate him, and that it is not a proper
subject of comment by counsel before the jury. Nor should it be taken into consideration by
the jury in determining the weight to be given to the witness' testimony. These remarks are
limited to a bona fide claim and the subject is fair matter for comment where the claim is not
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captioned parties invoke the privilege regarding central issues and there
is evidence to corroborate some present or past association with a party,
the only fair thing to do may be to present the situation to the jury and
let the jury decide. This extension is logical after Baxter v. Palmigiano
removed any doubts about the constitutionality of invocation-based ad-
verse inferences against parties in civil cases. The following section dis-
cusses recent decisions in which courts have applied these principles.
III. FEDERAL NONPARTY ADVERSE INFERENCE CASES
A number of post-Baxter courts have turned to adverse inferences
to alleviate the hardships resulting from invocations by nonparty wit-
nesses that fatally disrupt a party's claim or defense. Though often
achieving apparently fair results, many courts have provided little more
legal analysis than "ritualistic incantations"' 96 of Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 403. Adverse inferences should be used sparingly because of their
prejudicial nature, illustrated by the virtual impossibility of probing a
witness's reasons for invoking the privilege. When possible, less drastic
alternatives should be used. Disregarding this advice, some courts per-
mit adverse inferences in apparently unnecessary situations.9 ' Other
courts neglect adverse inferences when the facts of a case recommend
their use.198 Judges on two courts that considered adverse inferences
raised important questions in dissent that merit close attention in de-
ciding whether adverse inferences should be allowed and how that in-
formation should be presented to a jury. The following discussion looks
chronologically at cases in which adverse inferences based on nonparty
invocations of the privilege played a significant role.
A. Circuit Court Decisions
In Lionti v. Lloyd's Insurance Company 9' the plaintiffs sued their
insurance carrier after it denied their claim for fire insurance proceeds
made in good faith or the witness is not entitled to the indulgence sought. They are also
limited to witnesses who are not parties. A party offering himself as a witness in his own
behalf stands differently in this respect from a third person brought into court to testify in a
case in which he has no interest.
Id. (emphasis in original).
196. United States v. Alessi, 638 F.2d 466, 476 (2d Cir. 1980).
197. See infra note 247 and accompanying text.
198. Farace v. Independent Fire Ins., 699 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1983). In Farace the insured
sued to collect homeowner's fire insurance proceeds. Despite motive and conclusive physical proof
of arson, which the Fifth Circuit conceded was "arguably relevant evidence," the court declined to
find an abuse of discretion in the trial judge's refusal to admit evidence of insured's refusal to
cooperate with arson investigators. Brenner v. World Boxing Council, 675 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 835 (1982) (see discussion of Brenner infra note 215).
199. 709 F.2d 237 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 995 (1983).
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on their burned restaurant. The insurer pleaded arson. The evidence
conclusively indicated that the fire had been set intentionally, but there
was no direct proof that the plaintiffs were responsible. Circumstantial
evidence, however, clearly pointed to the plaintiffs. 00
The plaintiffs' theory of the case was that a disgruntled former em-
ployee who allegedly had threatened to destroy the restaurant had com-
mitted the arson. Prior to taking the stand, the employee told counsel
for the insurer that he had nothing to do with setting the fire. Before
this conversation, however, he told the insurance investigator that the
plaintiffs had asked him how to start a fire to destroy the restaurant.
Yet, on the stand, he invoked the fifth amendment in response to ques-
tions on these subjects, thereby possibly suggesting that he, and not the
plaintiffs, had burned the restaurant. Over hearsay objections, the in-
surance company was permitted to question the investigator about the
ex-employee's earlier remarks to show that those comments were incon-
sistent with the witness's later invocation of the fifth amendment. The
plaintiffs argued that admitting the investigator's testimony was revers-
ible error and that a later instruction to disregard the employee's invo-
cation of the privilege was too little too late.201 The majority held that
admission of the investigator's hearsay testimony was harmless error in
view of other overwhelming evidence, noting further that the trial court
had instructed the jury to give no evidentiary weight to the employee's
invocation of privilege.
In dissent, Judge Stern wrote that the majority made a "muscular
attempt" to escape becoming the initial court of appeals to decide
whether evidentiary value exists in a nonparty's invocation of the privi-
lege in a civil case.20 2 Judge Stern disagreed with the majority's implicit
affirmative answer to this question, arguing instead for limiting Baxter
inferences to parties. Though Judge Stern was less than accurate in
stating that juries are left only with "rank speculation" from which to
draw any inferences, he recognized the confusion over adverse infer-
200. Id. at 239. Restaurant sales had declined severely over the previous year, and an audit
presented at trial projected a $26,000 cash flow shortage. On September 11 Lionti's mortgagee gave
notice of its intent to call due a $392,000 loan and foreclose on the security interests. After orally
arranging a stay with the lender by agreeing to place the business up for sale, Lionti failed to
appear to sign the necessary documents on September 19, and the restaurant was destroyed by fire
the next day. Finally, within ten days of the fire, Lionti's son unsuccessfully tried to insure the
restaurant with an additional $500,000 in coverage, and his daughter uncharacteristically prepaid
three months' premiums on the policy that was litigated. Id.
201. Id. at 241-42. Lionti also objected to testimony by the investigator that the employee
had offered to give testimony favorable to the insurer for payment. The court allowed the investi-
gator to testify, over objection, that the employee told him that his information "would 'wrap the
case up for the insurance company and the Liontis were not dumb and they would be willing to
make a deal.'" Id.
202. Id. at 244.
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ences and consequently the need for a sounder methodology. 03
In Brink's, Inc. v. City of New York 20 4 the plaintiff sued the City
for damages after the City cancelled its contract to collect coins from
New York's parking meters because the City believed that a ring of the
plaintiff's employees were stealing some of the monies.0 5 The City
counterclaimed, contending that the plaintiff breached the contract
through negligent supervision of its employees, resulting in substantial
thefts of the meter collections. The plaintiff in turn filed a third-party
complaint against its collectors involved in the scheme. After the City
won a large jury verdict the plaintiff appealed alleging that the trial
court erroneously allowed the City to rely in closing argument on the
invocations of privilege by the plaintiff's ex-employees as circumstantial
evidence and that the court also erred by instructing the jury that it
could infer responses adverse to the witnesses' interests from those
refusals.
Beginning with the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Brink's court
acknowledged that although Congress rejected Rules 501-13 as promul-
gated, Proposed Rule 513206 provided a good starting point to analyze
the adverse inference question. This proposed rule prohibits comment
upon claims of privilege, evidencing a policy of strengthening the privi-
lege.207 The court noted, however, that if this policy remains viable, it is
only in the criminal arena because Baxter made a distinction between
civil and criminal cases and only allowed adverse comment about invo-
cations in civil cases. The court cited Professor Heidt to support its
holding that the employees' invocations of the privilege qualified as vi-
carious admissions against the plaintiff.208 On the facts in the record,
the court held that these fifth amendment claims were both competent
and admissible because the Constitution does not require their exclu-
sion.209 Next, the majority considered whether the adverse inferences
were unfairly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403,210 con-
cluding that the trial judge correctly determined that although damag-
ing, the inferences were not "prejudicial in the sense of being
203. Id. at 245. In light of the overwhelming evidence pointing to Lionti, it is doubtful that
such speculation would have been "rank."
204. 717 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1983).
205. Id. at 702. Before the suit was filed by Brink's, seven of their collectors had been ar-
rested, five of whom were charged and convicted for the thefts. Id.
206. See supra note 194.
207. Brink's, 717 F.2d at 708.
208. Id. at 709-10 (citing Heidt, supra note 108, at 1119-22).
209. Id. at 710 (citation omitted).
210. FED. R. Evm. 403. Rule 403 reads: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." Id.
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inflammatory."2"'
Judge Winter raised several important points in dissent. First,
Judge Winter argued that by allowing the examining lawyer to ask in-
creasingly damaging, fact-specific questions once it was clear the wit-
ness would invoke broadly the majority endorsed a strategy inviting the
jury to attach evidentiary value to questions, not answers.21 2 Under the
liberal Hoffman standard the invocations were permissible whether the
real answer was "yes" or "absolutely not;" yet by continuing to press
such pointed questions, the City's obvious intent was to insinuate in-
criminating responses.213 Second, Judge Winter maintained that oppos-
ing counsel essentially was denied the right to cross-examination and
was unable to rebut the inevitable negative inferences. This "evidence"
was analogous to hearsay statements plainly not admissible under the
Federal Rules of Evidence.21 Judge Winter wrote that the effect of the
inferences on the plaintiff was "devastating," and concluded that the
majority had created a standard "utterly without precedent.""1 5
211. Brink's, 717 F.2d at 710. The majority considered that although the inferences were
damaging to Brink's in their claims against the City, they benefited Brink's on their claims against
the culpable third-party defendants. One commentator criticized this as "makeweight," because
the employees would be insolvent for the amounts involved. Note, Magic Trick, supra note 173, at
383.
212. Brink's, 717 F.2d at 716. On direct examination, after two of the five witnesses made it
plain that "they would not testify in the conventional sense," the City's lawyer continued by ask-
ing specific questions phrased to suggest incriminating responses to the jury. Id. at 715. Judge
Winter argued that the only way Brink's could attempt to rebut the suggested inferences on cross-
examination was to engage in the "mindless exchange" of phrasing the identical questions in re-
verse. Id. at 716.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 716-17.
215. Id. at 717. Judge Winter distinguished Baxter on the basis that it involved party invoca-
tions: "[T]he issue is not whether adverse inferences may be drawn against a party who asserts the
fifth amendment in a civil action, but whether adverse inferences may be drawn against a party
because a witness (whether or not another party) asserts the fifth amendment," concluding that
they may not. Id. at 718 (emphasis in original).
Both majority and dissent ignored their earlier opinions in Brenner v. World Boxing Council,
675 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 835 (1982). In Brenner a promoter sued the Council
and its president, alleging an illegal conspiracy and group boycott to prevent him from promoting
WBC title fights. The key players were Brenner, the WBC and its president Jose Sulaiman Cha-
gnon, and Don King, a competing promoter who was not named a defendant. The Second Circuit
affirmed dismissal of the complaint because Brenner failed to prove a reasonable inference of con-
spiracy. On appeal Brenner argued that the district court erred by allowing Don King to invoke
the fifth amendment and compounded that error by not instructing the jury that it might draw an
adverse inference based on King's invocation of privilege. The court rejected these claims, noting
We also find no merit in Brenner's claim[] . . . that the district court erred in refusing to
instruct the jury that it might draw an adverse inference against appellees from King's invo-
cation of his Fifth Amendment privilege.. . . [S]ince King was a non-party witness, no ad-
verse inference against appellees could have been drawn from his refusal to testify.
Id. at 454 n.7. In light of this, the Second Circuit's decision in Brink's would appear to mean one
of two things: First, that it overruled this point of Brenner, sub silentio; second, and more likely,
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Judge Winter discussed significant unresolved issues. One commen-
tator writing on the Brink's opinion agreed with Judge Winter's obser-
vation that such interrogation indeed would constitute illicit lawyer
testimony if not constricted in some manner not yet articulated by any
court.2 16 Adverse inferences, however, may help restore the equities be-
tween parties sometimes upset when nonparties invoke the privilege, if
properly safeguarded so that Judge Winter's concerns are addressed.21 7
If sufficient indicia of trustworthiness were established, perhaps Judge
Winter would find the circumstances to be similar to a Baxter-type
party invocation.
The Eighth Circuit in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. A & P Steel, Inc.215
reversed denial of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe's (Tribe) motion for a new
trial, in part because the trial court had refused to allow the Tribe to
call a witness who intended to invoke the privilege and then argue ad-
verse inferences from the invocation. No adverse inference case can be
regarded as typical, but the facts of this case demonstrate the type of
situation in which adverse inferences would be justified. Michael Strain,
the attorney for Tribal Land Enterprises (TLE), a separate entity from
the Tribe, assisted the Tribe in securing a large government grant for
an irrigation project. The Tribe, through its chairman Edward Driving
Hawk, then negotiated and contracted with A & P Steel (A & P) for
construction of the system. Strain planned to embezzle money from the
project and did two things to accomplish this goal. First, he hired him-
self out as a "consultant" to A & P on the project, and second, he
formed a shell corporation to launder a small portion of the kickbacks
to Driving Hawk and Richard Lone Dog, Chairman of TLE.219
About one year into the contract, the Tribal Counsel, suspecting
fraud and corruption, sued A & P for fraud, conspiracy, and breaches of
warranty and contract. At his deposition, Lone Dog was represented by
Strain, who counselled him to answer falsely. 20 Lone Dog's trial counsel
then advised him to invoke the fifth amendment. A & P successfully
objected to the Tribe's attempt to call Lone Dog to the stand to force
that the invocations by Brink's employees were vicarious admissions of their employer and that
the witnesses were nonparties only in a technical sense. Had the evidence of conspiracy involving
Don King in the Brenner case been of such quality reasonably to prove that conspiracy, the court
should have instructed the jury that it could draw the inference against the WBC. See also Heidt,
supra note 108, at 1119-22.
216. Brodsky, The Fifth Amendment in Civil Cases, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 3, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
217. Rakoff, supra note 12.
218. 733 F.2d 509 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984).
219. Id. at 512. Payment by A & P to Strain for his "services" totalled over $173,000. Of this
amount, Strain paid Driving Hawk and Lone Dog about $26,000. Id.
220. Id. at 514. "Lone Dog's deposition testimony flatly contradicted the allegations con-
tained in the Tribe's complaint." Id.
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him to invoke the privilege in front of the jury. Ironically, the trial
judge allowed A & P to read Lone Dog's perjured testimony into the
record over the Tribe's objection, finding Lone Dog to be an unavailable
witness under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(1). The Tribe was una-
ble to prove the conspiracy among A & P, Strain, and tribal officers
Lone Dog and Driving Hawk beyond circumstantial evidence, nor could
it satisfactorily establish that Lone Dog had lied at his deposition. The
Tribe lost both on its complaint and on A & P's counterclaim. In a
subsequent criminal case against attorney Strain, Lone Dog testified to
the conspiracy before a federal grand jury, clearly exposing his false
deposition testimony. Based on the newly discovered evidence, the
Tribe moved for relief from judgment, but its motion was denied.221
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit initially held that the Rule 60(b) mo-
tion should have been granted based on the newly discovered proof of
the conspiracy revealed by Lone Dog's grand jury testimony. The court
then addressed the propriety of challenged jury instructions. Lastly, the
court held that the Tribe should have been permitted to rebut the un-
fair manipulation of the evidence rules which obscured the truth by
calling Lone Dog as a witness and by arguing to the jury the adverse
inference that should attach to his invocation. The unanimous majority
found support for this result in Baxter, stating that the policies behind
invoking the privilege are implicated less when inferences are drawn
from nonparty invocations than from party invocations.' Additional
support was gathered from Federal Rule of Evidence 501, expressing
Congress's intent to afford the courts flexibility with the rules of
privilege.223
The most significant aspect of Rosebud was the Eighth Circuit's
willingness to allow the adverse inference despite incomplete proof of
the conspiracy. From the court's perspective, the Tribe presented evi-
dence calling into doubt the truthfulness of Lone Dog's deposition, yet
not sufficiently strong to surmount the deposition's effect on the jury.
After the deposition was admitted, it was essential to counter A & P's
undue advantage by allowing the Tribe to call Lone Dog, despite his
intent to invoke the privilege. 224 Rosebud Sioux Tribe thus correctly
221. The appeal from the denial of the motion was then consolidated with the appeal from
the judgment of the action.
222. Id. at 521.
223. Rosebud, 733 F.2d at 522. The court noted:
In rejecting the proposed Rules and enacting Rule 501, Congress manifested an affirmative
intention not to freeze the law of privilege. Its purpose rather was to "provide the courts with
the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis" and to leave the door open
to change.




supports a flexible approach in using adverse inferences.22 5 The Eighth
Circuit purported to limit its holding to the unique facts of the case,
but the decision clearly provides authority for this remedy in related
circumstances. For example, the adverse inference remedy could be
used in situations in which the legal proof of control is wanting, yet
fairness demands that something be done.
In RAD Services, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company226 the
Third Circuit affirmed a judgment against the plaintiff rendered by a
jury which had been instructed to consider the invocations of privilege
by the plaintiff's nonparty agents. RAD, a waste management company,
embarked on a business venture to manufacture a fertilizer additive
from waste "fly ash" generated in steel mill pollution control devices.
RAD had warehoused two to three thousand tons of the ash when it
discontinued producing the additive because of a shrinking market. Un-
able to sell the accumulated ash and facing penalties for improper stor-
age, RAD sought to dispose of the material, but was unwilling to pay
the estimated five to six hundred thousand dollar cost of a legitimate
disposal program. The company attempted unsuccessfully to sell the
ash to a chemical broker for reprocessing. Ultimately, RAD officials ar-
ranged to have the waste dumped into a Kentucky strip mine and a
Tennessee farm and doctored records to show lawful disposal. State of-
ficials caught RAD's contractor dumping the ash and, when faced with
a 10,000 dollar per day fine, RAD paid for proper disposal. RAD then
filed a claim with its general liability carrier for reimbursement. Aetna
denied coverage because the illicit scheme fell under a policy exclusion
that insured events must be "neither expected nor intended" by the
insured.1 7 RAD then sued Aetna on the policy.
At trial Aetna successfully defended by showing that the insured's
agents intended the dumping. RAD argued on appeal that the court
erred by admitting the depositions of two RAD agents who responded
to questions regarding their employment by invoking the privilege, and
then aggravated this error by allowing the jury to draw adverse infer-
ences from these invocations.228
225. Commentators critical of the adverse inference approach nonetheless agree that the
Rosebud court reached the proper result. See, e.g., Brodsky, supra note 216, at 30, col. 1; see also
Note, Rosebud, supra note 173, at 1264-65. They, however, would have refused initially to allow
Lone Dog's testimony to be read to the jury. This viewpoint fails to acknowledge that in some
cases-perhaps this one-adverse inferences may be the only solution available to equalize the
parties after an invoking witness hinders presentation of evidence.
226. 808 F.2d 271 (3rd Cir. 1986).
227. Id. at 273 (emphasis in original).
228. Id. at 277. The jury was instructed:
During the trial you also heard evidence by past or present employees of the plaintiff refusing
to answer certain questions on the grounds that it may tend to incriminate them. A witness
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The RAD Services court acknowledged the Griffin-Baxter distinc-
tion that forbids adverse inferences in criminal cases, but allows them
in civil cases, noting that this difference arises in part from the search
for truth that justifies the adversary system.229 Under the facts of this
case, wrote the court, the policies that condone informing factfinders
when parties invoke the privilege likewise permitted the jury to con-
sider these nonparties' refusals to answer. 30
RAD argued that the invocations were inadmissible because there
was no proof that these witnesses had any loyalty to the company, and
because RAD was unable to cross-examine them to ferret out their pos-
sible attempts to discredit RAD. The Third Circuit held that a witness
intent on damaging his ex-employer would probably give directly in-
criminating testimony, rather than rely on a potential inference. Fur-
thermore, the trial judge would screen truly frivolous claims of
privilege, and counsel might persuade the jury that the invocation was
without probative value. Finally, approving the opposite rule would give
corporations the power to stonewall discovery by firing ostensible cor-
porate wrongdoers. Thus, nothing favors withholding a dismissed em-
ployee's invocation of privilege from the jury.231
The RAD Services court approvingly cited the concerns raised by
Judge Winter in his Brink's dissent. The Third Circuit maintained that
the trial judge, through his authority to control the manner by which
juries learn of nonparty invocations, must guard against the unfair
prejudice that may result when a lawyer, assured that the witness will
invoke the privilege broadly, badgers the witness on direct examination
with highly fact-specific questions simply to evoke damaging insinua-
tions.232 The RAD Services court was satisfied that these "sharp prac-
tices" had been avoided. The court concluded by noting that RAD was
not disadvantaged unfairly through its inability to cross-examine the
witnesses, nor had Aetna caused its adversary undue prejudice.23 3
Under the circumstances it was not error to admit the nonparty invoca-
tions, or to allow the jury to draw negative inferences therefrom.
In RAD Services the Third Circuit answered the question it had
has a constitutional right to decline to answer on the grounds that it may tend to incriminate
him. You may, but you need not, infer by such refusal that the answers would have been
adverse to the plaintiff's interests.
Id.
229. Id. at 274.
230. Id. at 275. The court also noted that the record was "replete with circumstantial evi-
dence" that the two invoking witnesses were involved in the purported plan to dump the toxic
waste. Id. at 277.
231. Id. at 276.
232. Id. at 277-78.
233. Id. at 280.
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avoided in Lionti. It is uncertain whether allowing the adverse infer-
ence was decisive, as arguments can be made each way.2"' RAD Ser-
vices, however, points out circumstances under which adverse
inferences might be abused and illustrates that a methodology for de-
termining their use would be helpful.
Finally, in Cerro Gordo Charity v. Fireman's Fund American Life
Insurance Co. 23 5 the Eighth Circuit reiterated its willingness to permit
adverse inferences based on nonparty invocations of the privilege. Leo-
nard Richards, cab driver, ordained minister, and management consult-
ant, instituted a fraudulent scheme over many years whereby he
insured his ill half-sister, May Wilson, with numerous hospital income
protection policies. Approximately 700,000 dollars was paid on these
policies to certain trusts that Richards controlled. When the insurance
companies began protesting coverage, Richards switched to death and
dismemberment policies amounting to more than 3.5 million dollars in
coverage on May Wilson upon her death, with the benefits payable to
the trusts, including Cerro Gordo. In 1982, May was found murdered,
and the scene had been altered to suggest a possible sexual assault.
Cerro Gordo, controlled at the time by Richards, sued to collect as
beneficiary of the policies after voluntary payments were refused. Fol-
lowing a lengthy trial the jury returned a verdict for the defendants,
finding that Richards had murdered his half-sister to collect the insur-
ance money. The charity raised several points on appeal, including trial
error in permitting the defendants to call Richards as a witness solely
to have the jury hear him invoke the fifth amendment. The Eighth Cir-
cuit reviewed its decision in Rosebud and agreed that, using a case-by-
case approach, the instant facts justified the inference.
Though not involved officially with the charity at the time of trial,
Richards had full control of Cerro Gordo when the suits were filed, so
there was reason to assume some loyalty to the plaintiff.236 As other
evidence of a design to defraud the companies was presented, the court
disagreed that the adverse inferences made Richards' invocations too
234. Id. at 274. RAD obviously thought that the adverse inferences were the critical differ-
ence between losing and winning, as their appeal rested solely on two aspects of this issue. Id. On
the other hand, the Third Circuit reviewed the proof and found enough other evidence supporting
the verdict to hold, alternatively, that any error on the issue was harmless. Id. at 280.
235. 819 F.2d 1471 (8th Cir. 1987).
236. Id. at 1481.
[T]he Second and Third Circuits, [in Brink's and RAD Services,] respectively held that it was
permissible to allow the invocation of the privilege to be made known to the jury when it is
invoked by a nonparty who was a former employee of a company a party to the litigation.
Richards, as a former member of Cerro Gordo, stands in a position similar to the non-party
ex-employees in those cases. Moreover, any concerns that Richards would invoke the privilege
solely for the purpose of harming Cerro Gordo are not present here.
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costly.2 37 In addition, as Richards was a "key figure" in the suits, whose
conduct provided the basis for the defense of fraud, the inferences
served to dispel any idea implied by his absence that Richards' testi-
mony would damage the insurance companies' case.138 Finally, the evi-
dence did not unfairly prejudice Cerro Gordo. Evidence only needs to
make it more likely than not that an alleged fact exists to be admissi-
ble.2 3 9 The inferences did just this, without more, and were not empha-
sized excessively in light of the other evidence, nor did it appear that
the jury rested its decision on the invocations alone. The other excep-
tions were without merit and the court affirmed.
The adverse inference in this case based on Richards' fifth amend-
ment claim of privilege against self-incrimination was a justified and
correct response to vitiate his sordid plan. These equities did not go
unnoticed by the Eighth Circuit;2 ' 0 but even if they had, the inference
could still have been sustained under Baxter on the theory that Rich-
ards was the real party in interest, or alternatively that he was the alter
ego of Cerro Gordo Charity.2 4' 1 Cerro Gordo supports piercing the corpo-
rate veil to see whether denying inferences based on invocations by
noncaptioned parties can be reconciled equitably with precedent al-
lowing consequences to inure to parties who invoke the privilege.
B. District Court Decisions
In addition to the three circuit courts that have approved adverse
inferences based on nonparty invocations, several district courts have
also examined the issue. A Minnesota federal district court in E. H.
Boerth Company v. LAD Properties242 held in post trial motions filed
by the defendant that nonparty adverse inferences were permissible. In
this case a land developer, his wholly owned construction contracting
firm, and the real estate limited partnership of which he was the sole
237. Id. at 1482. "The fact that Richards chose to invoke the privilege was only one of a
number of factors that the jury had to consider in determining whether a fraud had been commit-
ted. There was other evidence presented at trial that Richards sought to perpetrate a fraud on the
insurance companies." Id. (citation omitted).
238. Id. The court stated:
If anyone knew whether there was an intent to commit a fraud, it was Richards. Hearing
Richards invoke the privilege informed the jury why the parties with the burden of proof, i.e.
the insurance companies, resorted to less direct and more circumstantial evidence than Rich-
ards' own account of what had occurred.
Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1474. "For all the gambits, legal and otherwise, that this case has produced, how-
ever, overshadowing all is the stark reality of the murder that the jury found had been committed
and the motive that resulted in May Wilson's death." Id.
241. See In re Crabtree, 39 Bankr. 718 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984).
242. 82 F.R.D. 635 (D. Minn. 1979).
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general partner were sued after the venture collapsed by the under-
writer hired to sell the partnerships.24 The plaintiff was awarded dam-
ages to compensate for its efforts to sell the securities. At trial a witness
involved in the financial affairs of the partnership and the construction
company invoked the fifth amendment in response to specific questions
about the project's financing. The court reviewed the standard espoused
in Baxter and concluded that it was reasonable and fair for the jury to
draw inferences against the defendant from its employee's claim of
privilege.244
In Poplar Grove Planting and Refining Company, Inc. v. Bache
Halsey Stuart Inc.245 a brokerage firm was sued after its employee
made several unauthorized trades for the plaintiff's account, resulting
in large losses. The Louisiana federal district court noted that when the
responsible employee was questioned at trial, no objection was raised to
the characterization of his actions as illegal. The court eventually found
liability on the theory of respondeat superior and stressed the presence
of significant circumstantial evidence. The court felt compelled to draw
adverse inferences because the witness all but refused to testify, relying
extensively on the fifth amendment.2 46
In cross motions for summary judgment, an Oklahoma federal dis-
trict court in Financial Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Savings
Investment Corp.241 7 found that adverse inferences drawn from the dep-
osition invocations of a former defendant, excused from the litigation
by virtue of the automatic stay in bankruptcy, could be used deriva-
tively against the remaining thirteen defendants. 24s The court went on
243. By the time the developer's empire collapsed, for among other reasons, his diversion of
construction funds intended for the limited partnership project to other projects and overdisburse-
ment on the project itself, the companies were about $1 million short of funds to complete con-
struction of the limited partnership venture. This was revealed to the underwriter, and the
decision was made to obtain permission from the state securities office to withdraw the offer. The
plaintiff sued to recover commissions it would have obtained from subscribers had the deal gone
through. Id. at 640.
244. Id. at 645.
245. 465 F. Supp. 585 (M.D. La. 1979).
246. Id. at 591. The court explained that "[s]ince few, if any, of the questions posed to Ghio
were answered, this Court has no choice but to draw the inference from his refusal to testify that
he was responsible for the unauthorized acts complained of. Such inference may be drawn in civil
trials." Id. (citing Paynes v. Lee, 362 F. Supp. 797, 799 (M.D. La. 1973), aff'd, 487 F.2d 1307 (5th
Cir. 1974) (stating that "[w]hile ordinarily a person is not to be penalized for invoking this consti-
tutional protection, nevertheless, the Fifth Amendment does not guarantee that a person who in-
vokes it will not be subject to any unfavorable inference")).
247. 1987 Fed. Sec. L. Rptr. (CCH) 1 93,190 (W.D. Okla. 1986).
248. Id. Accord Young Sik Woo v. Glantz, 99 F.R.D. 651, 653 (D.R.I. 1983) (stating that "[i]f
such an inference can be drawn at trial, there is no substantial reason to forbid it in the paper trial
contemplated by Rule 56") (dicta). But cf. National Acceptance Co. v. Bathalter, 705 F.2d 924 (7th
Cir. 1983) (refusing to draw an adverse inference at the summary judgment stage against a defend-
ant who asserted the fifth amendment privilege in response to a plaintiff's complaint).
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to hold, however, that this complex case, which arose from a loan par-
ticipation and servicing agreement for a Utah resort and involved four-
teen defendants and eight causes of action, was inappropriate for
summary judgment. This ruling should not preclude withholding the
fact of invocation of the privilege from the factfinder if it would be un-
necessary to a fair adjudication.
Finally, in an SEC action against a securities underwriter, defend-
ants in SEC v. First Jersey Securities, Inc. 49 sought a stay of civil dis-
covery pending resolution of the parallel criminal investigation of
certain of its officers, agents, and directors.250 The defendants asserted
that they faced the objectionable choice of waiving the privilege or fac-
ing adverse inferences if they invoked. The magistrate refused to allow
the corporate defendant to assert vicariously the privilege claims of its
employees, and refused to stay discovery based on the invocation of the
privilege by the company's former chairman, also a defendant, because
he was not then under investigation. 51 Any adverse inferences based on
the employees' invocations were permissible because, as nonparties, the
witnesses did not risk losing the case.252
It is evident, particularly from the last two cases, that some courts
may be allowing adverse inferences when it is inappropriate to do so,
perhaps confusing the standards for nonparties with those for adverse
inferences against parties. In Financial Federal it would appear unnec-
essary, in light of the large number of litigants and the transaction
records, to permit adverse inferences based on the nonparty invocations
of the privilege. The reported opinion, however, is too scant to deter-
mine whether this was unfairly prejudicial. In First Jersey Securities
the magistrate considered the chairman's assertion of privilege "prema-
ture" because he was not at that moment compelled to testify. As a
party defendant, however, he was entitled to assert the privilege as
early as in his answer, if by responding he could provide testimony usa-
ble at a later criminal trial. The magistrate correctly decided that the
nonparty invocations could be used against First Jersey, but, in the pos-
ture of a motion for stay, did not indicate whether allowing the infer-
249. 1987 Fed. Sec. L. Rptr. (CCH) 1 95,954 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
250. Id.
251. The Magistrate distinguished a stay of discovery in a similar case, Brock v. Tolkow, 109
F.R.D. 116 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), on the grounds that in Brock, inferences would have been drawn on
party invocations, while here they would be drawn based on the invocations of the nonparty em-
ployees. Contra SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating that while it was
"loathe" to draw an adverse inference against a party who was also a criminal defendant in a
parallel proceeding, it did not hesitate to draw the inference when the invoker was merely under
grand jury investigation, but not facing trial).
252. First Jersey Securities, 1987 Fed. Sec. L. Rptr. (CCH) 1 95,958. The Magistrate cited
Brink's for this proposition.
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ence would be unfairly prejudicial at trial. These decisions indicate the
value of a methodological approach to determine whether to permit in-
ferences based on nonparty invocations of the privilege.
IV. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
A. Preliminary Questions
Rule 403253 overarches the entire analysis of witness invocation of
the fifth amendment: whether parties who anticipate that a witness will
invoke should be allowed to elicit that response at trial, and if so, how
the effect of the invocation should be presented to lay factfinders. Fo-
cusing on the outcome, this means deciding whether a particularly viru-
lent form of prejudicial evidence will reach the jury.2 54 The purpose of a
methodology is to provide structure in making a difficult decision. Sim-
plistic balancing or conclusory allegations that the Rule 403 test is met
are not sufficient for dealing with adverse inferences. All the above
courts might have engaged in the necessary analysis, but by neglecting
to articulate how this was applied, the message may be sent inadver-
tently to lower courts to allow adverse inferences broadly.
This consequence ought to be avoided. Issues of relevancy and ma-
teriality, for instance, should be looked at more critically. If a court
approaches the matter casually, permits continuous questioning of a
witness who continuously invokes the privilege and then later decides
that no meaning should attach to the invocations, the court faces the
impossible task of "unringing the bell."
The methodology that follows gives form and procedure to resolv-
ing the question of permitting adverse inferences based on nonparty in-
vocations. It seeks to address the objections raised by Judge Winter and
several commentators. The analysis contains enough flexibility to sup-
port its use in most cases and self-adjusts for the quality of the other
proof in an effort to avoid the futility of a restrictive rule that attempts
to govern every circumstance.255 Efforts such as this proposed method-
ology necessarily contain trade-offs. The quid pro quo for providing a
response to invocations that stifle apparently valid claims is to permit
253. For the text of Rule 403, see supra note 210. One commentator has implied "that the
limits of Rule 403 discretion are ultimately definable only in terms of good sense and an intuitive
grasp of fairness." Gold, supra note 13, at 64.
254. So potent, in fact, that in no decision located by this Author in which the jury was
permitted to draw the adverse inference, did the party thereby advantaged ever lose.
255. See, e.g., United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267, 292 n.32
(3rd Cir. 1985) (noting that in RICO actions brought by the government to purge a union of mob
domination, it was harmless error for the trial court to draw an adverse inference against the
defendants based on a nonparty's invocation because the evidentiary foundation to connect the
witness with the conspiracy was insufficient), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
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adverse inferences and comment if after working through the methodol-
ogy the equities against allowing the inference remain unswayed. Each
question is threshold to the next; if any hurdle is not cleared, further
analysis terminates, and the court should disallow questions soliciting
the witness to invoke the privilege.25
The relevancy of evidence is measured by a low standard.257 Rule
403 places limits on this broad definition: the character of the harms
implicated in this Rule suggest that its unarticulated goal is to attain
"truth through procedural fairness."2 5 With this in mind, the adverse
inference analysis begins with Rule 104, which directs the court to de-
termine preliminarily the admissibility of the invocation.259 The party
seeking proof from a witness whom he knows likely will invoke the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination must inform the court if he wishes later
to gain the adverse inference benefit.260 The court then hears the offer
of proof outside the presence of the jury on all proposed questions to be
asked. This offer involves a straightforward application of Rule 103211
and is especially important when invocations are considered eviden-,
tially. If the court fails to engage in this analysis and then instructs the
jury to disregard the invocations to which it was exposed, the jury will
probably (at least subconsciously) disregard the instruction.262
Next, the party seeking the testimony from the witness must intro-
duce any evidence it possesses of: (a) an expired Statute of Limitations;
(b) any immunity granted to the witness;23 (c) a previous waiver of the
256. In many instances, this means the witness will not be called to testify.
257. See FED. R. Evm. 401. Rule 401 states: "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Id.
258. Gold, supra note 13, at 65.
259. FED. R. EvID. 104(a). Rule 104(a) states in part: "Preliminary questions concerning the
qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evi-
dence shall be determined by the court." Id.
260. Counsel should know this well in advance of trial from discovery depositions and from
talking with the witness. If the witness invokes unexpectedly on the stand, the court should inter-
rupt to ask counsel at sidebar whether he intends to seek evidentiary value from the invocation. If
so, the jury is excused while the court proceeds through the adverse inference methodology.
261. FED. R. EVD. 103(2)(b). Rule 103(2)(b) reads: "The court may add any other or further
statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was offered, the objec-
tion made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making of an offer in question and answer
form." Id. (emphasis added).
262. Allen, When Jurors Are Ordered to Ignore Testimony, They Ignore the Order, Wall St.
J., Jan. 25, 1988, at 31, col. 6. This article concludes by explaining how Judge James L. McCrystal
of Erie County, Ohio has claimed to solve the problem. McCrystal videotapes witness testimony,
and edits out inadmissible testimony before playing it back to the jury. "Otherwise, [notes Mc-
Crystal] 'it's like spitting in milk-(afterward) you can't separate it out.'" Id.
263. This immunity must be coextensive with the protection against self-incrimination pro-
vided by the fifth amendment itself. Some states provide statutory immunity to facilitate private
civil enforcement of their unfair trade practices laws. Tennessee, for example, compels officers,
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privilege for the matters at issue; or (d) a double jeopardy bar to later
prosecution. 64 The objecting party must then be permitted to reply to
this proof. If one of these exceptions apply, the danger of self-incrimi-
nation has been removed, and the witness then is compelled to testify,
facing contempt sanctions if he refuses. The court, satisfied that the
witness will invoke the privilege in response to a particular line of rele-
vant questioning and that the testimony cannot be compelled, should
next ask whether the proof sought by adverse inference relates to a cen-
tral issue in the case."6 " Wigmore, in fact, argued this in 1891 when he
proposed abolishing the privilege and substituting instead certain limit-
ing exceptions, including a prohibition against incriminating questions
immaterial to the main issue.266 Invocations of privilege have never
been viewed as an independently sufficient substitute for proof;26 7 thus
if the questions that would trigger invocation do not relate to a central
issue, the analysis ends and Rule 403 mandates that the party be in-
structed not to elicit invocations in front of the jury.
When, on the other hand, the answer that the witness probably
would give, but for the privilege, is central to the claim, the court must
decide whether the proof can be provided through other means or other
witnesses. Fairness counsels avoiding borderline prejudicial evidence
when adequate substitutes exist. Numerous commentators advocate
this approach. 66 It is, however, the most subjective decision the judge
undertakes in this methodology. The party seeking the inference likely
will argue that no other source provides an equivalent substitute for the
evidence. The party seeking to avoid the inference is placed in a quan-
dary: to argue that other similar proof exists, he must point to evidence
stockholders, and agents to provide testimony and produce documents in these actions, but grants
them immunity against use of the testimony and evidence in any subsequent criminal action.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-107 (1988). Similarly, in the general immunity provision of its Criminal
Procedure Act, North Carolina purports to grant immunity from prosecution "in any criminal
case," except perjury or contempt, when the invoking witness is ordered to testify pursuant to the
article. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1051 (1988). In many instances, however, dual sovereignty prevents
these grants of immunity from compelling the responses that are sought. See, e.g., Rhode Island v.
Cardillo, 592 F. Supp. 655 (D.R.I. 1984) (despite double jeopardy bar of state prosecution, threat of
federal prosecution still existed; therefore, responses could not be compelled over valid claims of
privilege).
264. See, e.g., C. McCoRMICK, supra note 22, § 121, at 290; Baylson, supra note 193, at 837-
38.
265. In the context of a different remedy (dismissal), one author wrote that this would "re-
quire the court to ask if the information withheld will compromise the trier of fact's ability to
make a fair determination of the controversy." Note, supra note 142, at 598.
266. Wigmore, Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere, 5 HARv. L. Rav. 71, 87 (1891).
267. United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752 (1983); National Acceptance Co. v. Bathalter,
705 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1983); In re Sterling-Harris Ford, Inc., 315 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1963); Sahn v.
Pagano, 302 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1962).
268. See, e.g., Daskal, supra note 131, at 263; Hartwell & Kenyon, supra note 173, at 650-51.
[Vol. 42:507
1989] NONPARTY ADVERSE INFERENCES
against himself. This decision must be made by the court with close
attention to factors such as overall strength of the offeror's case, the
testimony and demeanor of other witnesses, the demeanor of the invok-
ing witness, the detriment likely to result from the absence of the infer-
ence, and the legal standard of proof required for the various claims."'9
If it is clear that other proof would suffice, the methodology again ter-
minates; however, if the indicated answer is "No," or is too close to call,
the judge proceeds to the next stage.
Exceptions to the hearsay rule are allowed, in general, because they
possess some indicia of trustworthiness.27 0 Adverse inferences have been
criticized strongly because the invocations lack similar reliability and
cannot be subjected to rigorous cross-examination. If no circumstantial
showing of trustworthiness can be made, it would be unfair indeed to
permit negative inferences against parties based on nonparty invoca-
tions. The cases, however, implicitly point to the tool needed to provide
corroboration and to reduce the hearsay dangers inherent in adverse
inferences. The judge should determine whether the nonparty can be fit
269. See Note, supra note 142, at 598-99. (stating that "as the evidence withheld becomes
more probative, the detriment caused by its absence increases correspondingly"). Unless somehow
corroborated, however, the mere fact that evidence is made more valuable because its absence
threatens to disrupt the factfinder's ability to make an accurate decision of the case does not make
the evidence more reliable. Cf. Note, The Theoretical Foundation of the Hearsay Rules, 93 HARv.
L. REv. 1786 (1980). This author explains:
[W]here much other evidence or far more credible evidence is available, there is no need to let
in hearsay that may mislead the jury. The very existence of other or better evidence, however,
implies that, even if the jury's error in evaluating the hearsay is large, its error in deciding the
case will be small since that decision reflects its consideration of all the other evidence in
combination with the hearsay. By contrast, . . . where there is little or no other evidence
probative of the issue, the evidence is most valuable to the case as a whole. Assume that a
significant reliability gap initially exists. Since that gap arises from the jury's overvaluation of
the evidence in question, one would expect significant error to remain in the jury's determina-
tion of the ultimate issue because no other information intervened in its decision process. It is
precisely when the unreliable evidence is highly probative and little other evidence is availa-
ble that the greatest danger appears. Thus, the greater the need, the greater the danger, and
the less the need, the less the danger.
Id. at 1801 (footnotes omitted). The dichotomy between the need for the evidence and reliability
appears logically unresolvable. On appellate review, however, jury verdicts are given the benefit of
all reasonable inferences that may be derived from the facts, so clearly inferences in general are
permitted. Thus, in the context of nonparty witnesses, if some level of corroboration is established,
adverse inferences can be justified. This Note attempts to define that minimum level of corrobora-
tion with an objective standard.
270. FED. R. EVID. 803(24). Under the residual hearsay rules, the judge can admit:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is
offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for
which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasona-
ble efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be
served by admission of the statement into evidence.
Id.; see also FED. R Evm. 804(b)(5).
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into one of the following Rule 801(d)(2) categories: (1) a person author-
ized to speak for the party; (2) an agent or employee who invokes as to
questions within the scope of his agency or employment; or (3) a co-
conspirator. Each invoking witness in the reported cases can be
recharacterized fairly into one or more of these three categories. The
Supreme Court recently indicated a broader view of which employees
may fall within the scope of the attorney-client privilege relationship in
the context of corporate litigation.271 If the questions prompting the in-
vocation of the privilege against self-incrimination relate to the time
such a relationship existed, this decision supports finding sufficient cor-
roboration to justify nonparty adverse inferences in the fact that these
relationships do or did exist. With Rule 801(d)(2) standards providing
guidance, the party seeking the inference must produce some initial cir-
cumstantial evidence of such a relationship.272 If the party cannot ad-
duce this evidence, once again the analysis terminates. When such
evidence is produced, however, the burden of production for the corrob-
oration issue shifts to the party seeking to avoid the inference to show
that no relationship exists.273
At this juncture, if the party seeking to avoid the inference cannot
meet the burden of showing that no relationship exists, the judge
should allow the party seeking the inference to question the witness
before the jury, despite the witness's intention to invoke the privilege.
Before actual questioning begins, however, the judge must require that
party to establish a factual basis for the questions asked to prevent pos-
sible abuse.2 74 Depending on the quality of this showing, together with
other factors such as strength of the case and circumstantial corrobora-
tion of these questions by testimony from other witnesses, the court
should exercise strict control over counsel's mode of questioning as pro-
vided under Rule 611(a). 5 When the questions posed are more
271. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
272. A simple way to accomplish this would be to subpoena corporate employment records.
273. For a discussion of shifting burdens of production, see Commercial Molasses Corp. v.
N.Y. Tank Barge Corp., 314 U.S. 104 (1941). See generally Bridge, Burdens Within Burdens at a
Trial Within a Trial, 23 B.CJ.. REv. 927 (1982) (discussing shifting burdens of proof on prelimi-
nary questions as functions of policy, fairness, and efficiency, then analyzing important provisions
of the Federal Rules of Evidence in light of these criteria).
Because arriving at this stage means having answered the previous threshold questions suc-
cessfully, this Note suggests that the party seeking to avoid the inference prove the no-relationship
question by at least clear and convincing evidence.
274. This factual basis may be established through arrest records, grand jury indictments,
pending criminal charges, documentation that the witness gave pertinent testimony in a previous
criminal trial, target letters (if obtainable), and the like.
275. FED. R. Evm. 611(a). Rule 611(a) states: "The court shall exercise reasonable control
over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the
interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless con-
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strongly corroborated, the court should allow more specific questions.
When corroborated to a lesser degree, the court might even require
counsel to question as if on direct, allowing no leading questions.
Taken together, these measures should assist in determining
whether to allow invocations purposefully to reach the jury and, if so,
how that might be accomplished. The methodology establishes a frame-
work within which to make this decision, thereby avoiding amorphous
balancing under Rule 403. Further, by incorporating corroborative mea-
sures and by advocating latitude on the part of the judge in controlling
the mode of questioning, the hearsay dangers raised by Judge Winter
and others receive adequate attention. The final section proposes a
Model Jury Instruction for use when nonparty witness invocations of
the privilege are offered to the jury.
B. Model Jury Instruction
In the decisions previously discussed, no party favored by an ad-
verse inference instruction based on a nonparty invocation lost the case;
therefore, fair presentation of the charge is essential. Special effort
should be made to keep the instruction as balanced as possible in order
to take the "sting" out of its presentation. The court must make it plain
to the jury that it may consider the invocation as it might other evi-
dence, but only if reliable.
It has been argued that these inferences should not be permitted
because lay juries, unaware of the broad grounds on which a witness
may properly invoke the privilege, naturally assume the most damning
reasons.27 6 Still others have argued that the adverse inference derives
not from the invocation but from the witness's silence. 7 These objec-
tions to adverse inference jury instructions are "unduly apologetic and
contrived" 278 and are insufficient to prevent instructing the jury on ad-
verse inferences once fairness indicates their use. The jury can be in-
formed of the broad scope of proper invocations. Attempting to instruct
the jury to draw the inference from the witness's silence rather than his
invocation is useless. Separating the two conceptually is possible for an-
alytical minds, but in practical effect accomplishes nothing. The follow-
ing model instruction seeks to account for the necessary factors and
presents, in as balanced a fashion as possible, the option to consider
inferences that may be drawn from the privilege:
During the trial, you heard [a] [certain] witness[es] refuse to answer questions
sumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment." Id.
276. See Hartwell & Kenyon, supra note 173, at 655; Rakoff, supra note 12, at 2.
277. Daskal, supra note 131, at 272; Hartwell & Kenyon, supra note 173, at 653, 661.
278. Kaminsky, supra note 141, at 448.
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on the ground that to do so may tend to incriminate them. The fifth amendment
gives every witness the right to refuse to give testimony which might be used
against him in a criminal trial, even if the testimony would only reveal clues about
his alleged crime. Witnesses may claim their fifth amendment privilege for many
reasons; claiming the privilege does not necessarily mean they committed any
crime. For instance, if suspicious circumstances make it appear that the witness is
guilty of some crime, but in fact he is not, he has a constitutional right to refuse to
answer questions that might imply his involvement. Also, if the witness fears that
he may be prosecuted for perjury, he has a perfect legal right to claim the privilege
for this reason alone, and may be entirely innocent of any act implied by the ques-
tions. So, the privilege may be asserted for several different reasons.
You must decide, based on all the evidence presented to you, what those asser-
tions of privilege mean. Evidence was presented of a relationship between the wit-
ness[es] and the [plaintiff/defendant], and the lawyers for both the plaintiffs and
the defendants argued in their closing statements what you should infer from the
witness[es]' assertions. You may choose to give those assertions the evidentiary
weight you believe is justified in light of all the other evidence, but no more. If you
decide that the assertion of privilege has some value as evidence, that evidence can
only be considered against that witness and the party with whom there was proof
of a relationship. You may not render your verdict based solely on a witness' re-
fusal to testify; your verdict must be supported by other evidence independent
from the inferences you may draw from any such refusal.
On the other hand, you may choose to give the claim of privilege no eviden-
tiary value at all. If you believe that the witnesses' assertion of privilege does not
indicate anything one way or the other regarding the question that prompted him
to invoke, then you should infer nothing from his claim of privilege. Again, your
verdict must be based on substantial evidence, altogether apart from any signifi-
cance you may attach to an assertion of privilege.
2 7
0
Although lengthier than the instruction given in RAD Services,280
the model instruction endeavors to use plain language in an attempt to
be easier to understand.2 11 By incorporating examples of legal standards
that support valid invocations, jurors are made aware that invoking the
privilege can be consistent with innocence and are reminded to consider
that possibility. Though some might consider this charge a "milk and
cookies" attempt at balancing that which cannot be balanced, this
charge strikes a fair medium by giving neither a favorable nor an unfa-
vorable emphasis to drawing the inference.
V. CONCLUSION
When nonparty witnesses assert the fifth amendment privilege in
civil litigation, two important policy interests collide. The Supreme
Court has decided that until all threats of prosecution are removed, the
279. A similar instruction was given in the In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Case, No.
M.D.L.-310 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 1980). The instruction is reprinted in Baylson, supra note 193, at 846.
280. RAD Services v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 808 F.2d 271 (3rd Cir. 1986); see supra note
10 for jury charge.
281. See generally Higginbotham, Helping the Jury Understand, 6 LITIGATION 5, 6 (Summer




witness is entitled constitutionally to claim the protection that the priv-
ilege affords from the "cruel trilemma" of self-accusation, perjury, or
contempt. From the perspective of the party seeking testimony from
the witness, these invocations of privilege can thwart his effort to ob-
tain relief if the privilege blocks access to essential, irreplaceable evi-
dence. Conversely, if the invocation is admitted substantively, the party
against whom an unfavorable inference would operate faces the task of
rebutting hearsay dangers of evidence that cannot effectively be cross-
examined.
For years, the standard response of courts was to screen invoca-
tions of privilege from juries and to instruct against any adverse infer-
ence arising from invocations which came to the jury's attention. In the
mid-1970s federal courts began to permit factfinders to draw adverse
inferences against claims of privilege by parties. Civil liability creates
no risk of self-accusation, so adverse inferences and comment do not
encroach impermissibly upon the important policies behind the privi-
lege. More recent courts, attempting to right the scales thrown out of
kilter when certain nonparty witnesses invoke the privilege, also have
permitted adverse inferences against the parties.
When a relationship sufficient to muster exception to the hearsay
rules exists between a party and a nonparty witness, allowing adverse
inferences does not eviscerate the policies and purposes of the privilege
because the witness is not compelled to convict himself. On the other
hand, allowing nonparty invocations of the privilege that unfairly hin-
der discovery or proof to go unchecked, mocks the goals of liberal dis-
covery and hearkens back to the time when masquerading one's case
was considered sporting. Inferences drawn from nonparty invocations,
however, are not the ultimate solution, nor should they be viewed as
such. Witnesses can invoke the privilege broadly, and the privilege can
protect innocent persons caught in dubious circumstances. The rela-
tionships between parties and nonparty witnesses should be scrutinized
with care. When viewed as one response among many, including preclu-
sion of the witness's testimony if unfair prejudice outweighs any possi-
ble gain rendered from its use, the adverse inference can be useful in
countering the negative effects that may result from the invocation of
privilege, particularly when the benefited party's adversary is a corpora-
tion because it can only act through its agents and employees.
This Note has defined the interests at stake and surveyed the poli-
cies at issue. Courts that have faced the nonparty adverse inference is-
sue have demonstrated the need for a more structured decisionmaking
tool. The methodology in the last section of this Note seeks to fill that
void by measuring the necessity and reliability of the inference in ques-
tion. Lastly, when the choice is made to go forward with the adverse
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inference option, the Model Jury Instruction presents the matter to lay
factfinders in a proper, balanced form. Adverse inferences are likely to
grow in popularity among the courts as more litigants bring suit under
quasi-criminal statutes. As more courts are faced with the issue of find-
ing remedies to counterbalance nonparty invocations of the privilege,
they should choose their options carefully with attention to the inter-
ests of all involved. The decision to permit adverse inferences should be
made sparingly because, in all likelihood, the party against whose inter-
ests an inference is drawn will lose the case.
Charles H. Rabon, Jr.*
* The Author wishes to thank the Honorable William J. Haynes, Jr., United States Magis-
trate, United States District Court, Middle District of Tennessee, for his helpful comments and
suggestions in the development of this Note.
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